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Submitted to the

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in Partial Fulfillment of

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AN ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this research was to examine and analyze the experiences and contributions of the Western European Union in the light of the organization's purposes and objectives and in view of the attempts toward European integration, in order to provide a basis on which to justify a positive view concerning WEU's future role in Western Europe. The basic data gathering method used in conducting this study was a chronological review of documents and minutes of the WEU Assembly, published in the Proceedings of the Assembly. This primary source material was supplemented by numerous books and articles concerning political, economic, and military activity in Western Europe. The basic conclusion arrived at because of this research is that in view of the contempory political problems and prospects in the Atlantic Alliance and in Western Europe, the Western European Union is destined to play a very significant role in the future.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1948, the Western European countries that had been allies in World War II (Great Britain, France, and the Benelux Countries) pledged themselves in the Treaty of Brussels to a joint defense system and agreed upon the creation of a Western Union Defense Organization with three commanders-in-chief and a permanent council above them. The primary motivation to form such an organization was supplied by the hostile image of the Soviet Union's intentions compared with the weak state of European defenses. Initially, it was assumed that the United States would support this move to strengthen European security from the outside, much in the same manner as it had supported European economic recovery through the Marshall Plan. However, because of the magnitude of the perceived threat posed to American security by the Soviet Union in Europe and the fact that the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was without sufficient military power and without an effective economic base, the United States undertook a series of actions which clearly illuminated the nature of the "revolution" which had occurred in American foreign policy. Among these were the Vandenberg Resolution for association with collective security agreements, the North Atlantic Treaty

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In 1949, the American Congress committed itself to the defense of Europe as it never had before. Prompted by the Soviet Union's creation of a Western German Federal Republic with its own military establishment, and by the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, the United States joined eleven other countries in signing the North Atlantic Treaty. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States agreed to station troops in Europe and to provide military equipment to the European members of the alliance. Although the Truman Administration had always maintained that the primary responsibility for the defense of Europe lay with the Europeans themselves, the United States had also undertaken a military commitment to Europe's defense. The Administration had hoped that the presence of American troops would encourage the Europeans to do more for their own defense. Instead, the European governments, relying on the American commitment, did less. The military contribution of the European members of NATO remained disappointingly small throughout the 1950's.

The failure of the European members of NATO to live up to their promises was not the only disappointment that the Truman Administration experienced in its efforts to create a strong military establishment in Western Europe. Within the United States, the Administration encountered serious opposition to its defense policies. Many Americans, including some of the President's own advisers, were unwilling to support the kind of military establishment that the Administration thought necessary. Some Americans opposed the Administration's policies because they thought that the United States was attempting to do too much in Europe. Others opposed the Administration's policies because they thought that the United States was not doing enough. Many Americans opposed the Administration's policies because they thought that the United States was doing the wrong things in Europe. Some Americans opposed the Administration's policies because they thought that the United States was doing the right things in the wrong way.

itself, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. Because of the American decision to support a defense organization with an Atlantic image rather than a European image, the Brussels Treaty Organization faded into the background. The North Atlantic Council superseded the Western Union Council in defense matters, and the Western Union Supreme Commands were superseded by the Atlantic Supreme Commands. The obligations for mutual assistance incurred by the member states of the BTO were still in effect; however, the functions of the organization gradually receded to a point where they encompassed primarily cultural and social matters. However, a series of international events in the early 1950's served to create the need for a resurrected form of the BTO.

Although the defense obligations incurred under the NATO Treaty became effective almost immediately, the actual strengthening of European defenses was not so readily forthcoming. But the beginning of the Korean War was soon to throw a "spotlight" on the actual state of Western defenses in Europe. It was readily apparent that Western Europe was in no better position to repel an attack than South Korea had been. Neither NATO nor the BTO had the land forces necessary to halt successfully a large communist land force sweeping into Europe. The immediate problem was, therefore, one of how to raise the necessary defensive forces in the

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simplest and most expeditious manner. The logical answer to this dilemma was the raising of German troops to defend West Germany; however, logic and the emotional sentiment of the rest of the European members of NATO were far apart on this question.

Feeling the greatest sense of urgency, the United States took the initiative in the crisis and offered to increase substantially its contribution to European defenses by way of a senior American officer to be Supreme Allied Commander, in addition to increased funds, troops, and equipment. The quid pro quo for this offer was that West Germany be rearmed and admitted as a full member of NATO. The offer of vastly increased United States support for European defenses was highly attractive to the Europeans; however, in spite of the logic involved, the thought of a rearmed Germany (only five years after the fall of the Third Reich) was quite another matter.

After much diplomatic maneuvering, European response to the American condition came in the form of the Pleven Plan, for a highly-integrated European Army, which plan was initiated by the French government. As viewed by certain members of the French government and other distinguished Europeans, the Pleven Plan would serve to supervise German rearmament, while it would also strengthen the movement

toward European integration, because of the supranational aspects of control inherent in the plan.

After some initial reservations about supporting a European Army instead of direct integration of German troops into NATO, the United States placed its support behind the Pleven Plan's creation of a European Defense Community (EDC). However, the initial European enthusiasm for the bold move in the area of European defense was not enough to obtain rapid consent by the proposed member states (France, the Benelux Countries, Italy, and West Germany). The state which proved most troublesome, in spite of growing United States pressure to accept the EDC, was France. On August 30, 1954, after three years of discussion and debate and after the other member Parliaments had ratified the EDC Treaty and the European Political Community (EPC) section which had been added, the French Parliament rejected the EDC Treaty.

The various reactions to the French rejection of EDC immersed the Western Alliance in one of the most severe crises it had faced since its birth. The sharpest reaction of all came from the United States, which had been one of the strongest advocates of the plan, because it deemed the plan a vital and necessary step toward strengthening Western defenses. The most pessimistic observers interpreted the situation as being a prelude to the disintegration

of the Western Alliance. Whether this was actually the case is irrelevant; the point is that the severity of the crisis caused the creation of a new organization to fill in the gap left by the "corpse" of EDC. The organization, which is the subject of this research, is the Western European Union (WEU), an organization built on the existing, but lifeless, body of the Brussels Treaty Organization or Western Union.

The primary reason for the creation of WEU, in 1955, was to provide a means of rearming West Germany and integrating her military forces into the NATO Army, and, in addition, to welcome her officially into the community of Western nations as a sovereign and equal member--except for certain armament restrictions. In addition to being a means for accomplishing this end, WEU, as an organization, was given certain functions in various areas of European activity. The most significant of these was its duty to control the level of armaments of the member states. The remaining areas of WEU's responsibility included functions in European defense planning and functions in the area of European social and cultural activity.

Although WEU became an operating European organization under the London and Paris Agreements of 1954, it has never enjoyed the full confidence and support of its member states. From the beginning of its existence, the WEU

has been viewed by many only as a stop-gap measure--an expedient to relieve the pressure created by the EDC crisis. The very fact that the organization was rather inadvertently given a parliamentary organ, the Assembly (because of a reference in the listed duties of the Council of Ministers) illustrates the haste in which WEU was conceived and the thought which was given to its future usefulness. In spite of these unusual working conditions, the WEU has weathered through the experience of non-support by its member states and, while doing so, has contributed significantly to the cause of European integration. From time to time, observers of the European scene have accused the organization of being superfluous--charging that WEU is merely duplicating the work done by other European organizations. These charges are followed by proposals to dissolve the WEU and/or the transfer of its functions to existing or proposed organizations.

Some of the charges were valid and have resulted in the WEU voluntarily transferring some of its allotted functions to other organizations. Some of WEU's military functions have been absorbed by NATO, while its work in the cultural and social areas has been transferred to the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, this logical reorganization of tasks has led some to believe that the WEU is in the ambiguous position of an organization without a purpose.

This is not the case. The WEU has played an important and a useful role in Europe thus far, and it is the opinion of this author that WEU is destined to play a central role in the European organization of the future.

The purpose of this research is to examine and analyze the experiences and contributions of WEU in light of the organization's purposes and objectives and in view of the attempts toward European integration, in order to provide a basis on which to justify the view concerning WEU's role in the future.

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CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND ORIGINS OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

In order to understand clearly the forces which caused the creation of the Western European Union (WEU) in the mid-1950's, it is first necessary to review briefly the major international events which brought this action about. Central to the entire period is the rise and fall of the planned European Defense Community (EDC) and the repercussions its fate had on American relations with Western Europe.

Prior to June, 1950, in the period of infancy for NATO, there was a great deal of serious discussions and planning on an elementary level by representatives from the member states concerning the needs and goals of Western defense in Europe. The zeal with which the problems were discussed, however, was by no means overwhelming for a number of reasons. Among them was the fact that tensions over Berlin had receded somewhat and the Western European states were heavily committed financially to their own problems--domestic ones and those arising in their colonial empires. However, the outbreak of the Korean War served to inject a new sense of urgency into the planning stage talks about European defense. The actions of the communists in the Far East caused a wave of fear to pervade Western Europe which

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RESPONSIBILITY ENCOURAGED AND OBTAINED BY WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

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anticipated a similar invasion by the communists into the Western European area.

One of the immediate results of this flurry of activity concerning new measures to be taken for Europe's defenses was the further institutionalization of NATO. The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization quickly agreed to the following measures--the creation of an integrated NATO defense force under centralized command and the establishment of an international staff and the Standing Group to assist the Supreme Commander in carrying out his expanded responsibilities.[1] There was one main issue, however, which the Council could not agree upon--the raising of German troops to aid in Europe's defense. The proposal for the rearming of Germany had come from Mr. Acheson, the American Secretary of State, who advanced the strong American opinion that Germany had to be rearmed if NATO was to be prepared to do its job.[2]

The American case for German rearmament was logical enough in terms of statistics; however, it was still an emotionally-packed issue for the Europeans to consider realistically, in spite of the perceived threat from the

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[1]Royal Institute of International Affairs, Britain in Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 25-26.

[2]Ibid.

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[1]Royal Institute of International Affairs, Britain in European Defense (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 12-13.

[2]Ibid.

Soviet Union. The United States then proceeded to make its position clear in the situation by offering to underwrite in troops, equipment, and money the strengthening of NATO but on the condition that a German contribution could be arranged in a reasonable amount of time.[3] The global nature of United States defense commitments, coupled with the internal problems and colonial difficulties of major Western European nations (such as, France and Great Britain), seemed to point to German rearmament as the only plausible course in the minds of American policymakers.

Primary among the obstacles which stood in the path of German rearmament was French opposition to rearming Germany and German reservations about rearming unless they were guaranteed full partnership status with the West.

After several months of deliberation concerning the dilemma created by the United States position, the primary European solution was offered in the form of the "Pleven Plan" which called for the creation of a European Army composed of forces from each of the member states that would operate under joint control.[4]

In February, 1951, a conference of representatives from the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), France Defeats EDC (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 4-7.

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(ECSC) was called in Paris by the French government to discuss the merits of the "Pleven Plan." By December of the same year, a firm plan for a European Defense Community (EDC), under the joint control of a joint Defense Commission, was agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of the Six. The EDC was to be composed of the Commission, a Council of Ministers with an Assembly and a Court of Justice parallel to the institutions of the ECSC. By May, 1952, the Treaty establishing the EDC was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the Six.[5]

British official reaction toward the proposed EDC was much the same as it had been toward the ECSC. The British government strongly supported the plan as a positive and necessary step for the Six; however, for a variety of reasons, they felt that Great Britain was unable to join such an organization. In November, 1950, Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, explained the British rejection of EDC membership to the House of Commons on the grounds that a European Army would only delay the defense of Europe and that the European framework was too restricted for effective defense.[6] These reasons given by the Foreign

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[5] European Organizations (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1959), p. 12.

[6] Hans Joachim Heiser, British Policy with Regard to Unification Efforts on the European Continent (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1959), p. 57.

Secretary no doubt supply part of the basis for Great Britain's position; however, the primary reason seemed to be that Great Britain was not ready to admit her relative decline in great power status by tying herself primarily to Europe. Great Britain's position, during the EDC negotiations and her subsequent positions on the later movements toward European integration (Common Market and Euratom), reflect the continuing British illusion that she still retained the world power status she held in World War II. This distorted British self image, which certainly did not serve her best interests and which even the results of the Suez affair could not immediately dispel, remained paramount in British policy until the early 1960's. Great Britain would consent to being associated with the defense efforts, similar to the American relationship with Europe and she would agree to commit national forces to the Continent, but that was the extent of the affiliation Great Britain desired.

The reaction of the United States toward EDC was strongly positive. Beginning in 1950, the United States began pressuring our NATO Allies to rearm Germany in order to facilitate fulfillment of conventional force levels in the "forward area." To soothe French fears of a rearmed Germany, the United States directed all its influence toward promoting passage of the French proposed EDC. From

the American point of view, the EDC would serve the dual purpose of strengthening NATO defenses securely to the Western camp. American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles campaigned vigorously on behalf of EDC among the rest of NATO. When, after over two years of delay, the French Chamber of Deputies was the only parliament of the Six to turn down EDC, there were strong indications of an impending change of United States policy toward Europe. The situation confronted the Eisenhower Administration with what Mr. Dulles termed "an agonizing reappraisal of its basic foreign policy toward Europe."[7] The birth of WEU a few short months later would appear to have everted any radical change in American-European policy. What changes would have occurred without WEU are extremely difficult to predict. Basically, there were three possible courses of action for the United States to pursue: a reduction of the American commitment to Europe (the apparent intent of the threat); a prolonged acceptance of the status quo of European defenses at that time; or an increased American commitment in spite of the lack of compliance with American requests (proving the threat was, indeed, an idle one). Considering the value placed by the United States on the

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[7]United States Department of State, Bulletin (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 4, 1954), p. 5.

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[5]United States Department of State, Bulletin
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physical security of Europe in the context of the total American security system and the extent of the heavy American military commitment to Europe in the early 1950's, the first course of action seems highly unlikely. The most probable course of United States policy, even if WEU had not appeared almost immediately would have been somewhere between the two latter courses.

In spite of strong American support for EDC and the milder British willingness to associate itself with EDC, the Treaty was eventually rejected by the French National Assembly. From May of 1952 until the fatal vote in August, 1954, successive French governments refused to submit the EDC Treaty to debate because they each doubted their ability to secure a favorable vote for it. Finally, in August, 1954, as a result of many pressures and circumstances, the Government of Premier Mendés-France submitted the Treaty to the French Assembly where it was rejected by a combination of Communists, Gaullists, Socialists, and Radicals.[8]

The reasons for the French rejection of the Treaty are a result of the complex blend of the political atmosphere in France during that period. Among the major reasons were: (1) France's reluctance to participate in a

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[8] European Organizations, op. cit., p. 12.

defense organization with Germany without Great Britain being a member of the organization; and (2) French Nationalist's opposition to the submerging of the French Armed Forces into a supranational organization when Great Britain refused to do so.

Upon the French refusal to ratify the EDC Treaty, the problem of how to rearm Germany in a manner which France would accept seemed to take on a new sense of urgency for Great Britain and the other European nations concerned with NATO defense. Great Britain represented in the person of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was to take the initiative in attempting to fill the void left by the then dead EDC Treaty. On August 31, 1954, the very day of the publication of the failure of EDC, the London Times made the following observations:

> . . . . Speed and decision are now essential. The least France can do is to make no difficulties about the restoration of Germany sovereignty . . . . The next few weeks are as vital as recent months have been.
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> The lead for a new framework within which to build German rearmament and ally her to the West, would now best come from Great Britain.
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> In spite of the great shift of power, it is still to this country that France looks, rather than the United States . . . . Sir Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden now have it in their power to play the decisive part which they have hitherto felt themselves precluded from playing. Desperate and disappointing

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> . . . Speed and decision are now essential. The latest French can do is to make no difficulties about the reabsorption of Germany sovereignty . . . . The next few weeks are as vital as any recent months have been.
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> The lead for a new framework within which to build German rearmament and ally her to the West, would now have come from Great Britain.
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as the French veto is, it gives Britain a second chance to lead Europe.[9]

The British government took the initiative when, on September 2, it suggested a conference of the Six, the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Mr. Eden then set off on a continental tour where he, in rapid succession, visited with the governments of the six EDC signatory nations. The purpose of the trip was to lay the groundwork for the success of the impending conference. The form Mr. Eden's solution took was basically: (1) to end the allied occupation in Germany and to re-establish German sovereignty; (2) to invite Germany to become a full and equal member of NATO; and (3) to bring West Germany and Italy into the Western-European security system of the Brussels Treaty Organization.[10]

The reasons for the seemingly rapid "about face" of British attitude toward involvement with Europe, although never officially stated as such, seemed to be based on the following:

1. The realization that EDC was for all practical purposes dead and the problem it was supposed to solve remained growing older and in a sense more urgent day by day. While the exact future of EDC remained suspended, Great Britain seemed to take comfort in the thought that somehow it would get through without a genuine commitment on her part. Because EDC was dead Great Britain seemed to realize that without her commitment the problem would not be solved.

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[9]Heiser, op. cit., p. 67. [10]Ibid., p. 68.

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The reasons for the essentially rapid "about face" of British attitude cannot be known, although [illegible] undoubtedly existed as soon, viewed the [illegible] following:

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[9]Eden, EDC, p. 97. [10]Ibid., p. 98.

2. The British, feeling that perhaps their attitude and aloofness toward EDC, contributed heavily toward its defeat.

3. The thought that perhaps a strong supranational organization like EDC could have held some serious disadvantages for Great Britain if she was completely outside the organization.

4. The strong pressures brought to bear by the United States on Great Britain to correct the British-aided debacle.

Two conditions for any alternative organization to replace the EDC became clear after Mr. Eden's talks on the Continent. First, the creation and success of any such system would require and depend on full British participation. A second condition was that the organization must provide for German rearmament. These conditions were recognized in a communique issued by Mr. Eden and M. Mendes-France after their meetings in Paris on September 15 and 16.[11] Having already agreed in principle to these primary conditions for a substitute defense organization, the representatives to the Nine Power Conference held in London took less than six days to draft their decisions into document form.

The document was titled "The Final Act of the Nine Power Conference held in London between September 28 and October 3, 1954." Among the primary decisions and declarations were the following:

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[11] Ibid., p. 69.

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[17]Ibid., p. 69.

1. The occupation regime in West Germany should be ended and German sovereignty should be re-established;

2. The Federal Republic of Germany would be invited to join NATO.

3. The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would be invited to accede to the Brussels Treaty.

4. In addition to expanded membership of the BTO, the functions and responsibilities would be enlarged particularly in the areas of European defense and armaments.

5. The name of the Brussels Treaty Organization be changed to Western European Union (WEU).

6. That Great Britain (in addition to being a member of WEU), Canada, and the United States should declare their support of European unity, including a particular British pledge to keep four divisions and a tactical air force on the Continent.[12]

In order to expand the declarations and decisions embodied in the "Final Act" of the London Conference into a full-fledged treaty, the representatives, after having time to consult with their own governments, adjourned to Paris to construct the treaty. The agreements were drawn up in a series of protocols which were signed by the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned on October 23, 1954, in Paris. The main points provided for in these documents, known as the Paris Agreements, were:

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[12]United States Department of State, London and Paris Agreements September-October 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 9-30.

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12. United States Department of State, London and Paris Announcements September-October 1954 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 9-10.

1. Amendment and expansion of the Brussels Treaty to include Western Germany and Italy.

2. Changing the name of the BTO to WEU.

3. The termination of the occupation regime in Western Germany.

4. The admission of the German Federal Republic to NATO.

5. A Franco-German agreement on the Saar, which was to have a European Statute within the framework of WEU.[13]

A very logical question comes to mind at this point--why was the EDC unacceptable to Great Britain and France, whereas the WEU proposal had just the opposite results? As far as Great Britain was concerned, the WEU was acceptable because it contained none of the supranational tendencies or implications of the EDC which she felt unable to participate in. By being a full member of an intergovernmental organization like WEU, Great Britain could retain a definite voice in the matters of European defense without suffering the loss of any sovereignty to a supranational executive. The EDC was found wanting in French eyes because France feared German rearmament in the context of an organization in which she was the only major power. There was no concrete guaranty in the French view that Great Britain or NATO would accept a major role in controlling the creation

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[13] Ibid., pp. 37-63.

[illegible]

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of new German military forces. On the other hand, WEU made German rearmament acceptable to France because it was accompanied by a British commitment to full membership in the organization and a treaty pledge to maintain forces on the Continent. This was accompanied by a German pledge to agreed-upon force levels and restrictions on certain armaments plus the fact that German admission to NATO was provided for.

The most important provisions for modifying and completing the revision of the Brussels Treaty were contained in four protocols. The first protocol begins in Article I by recording the admission of West Germany and Italy to the organization. In Article II, the Preamble to the Treaty is modified by deleting the aim of concerted action "in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" and substitutes the object of "promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe." Then follow the three main provisions of the protocol. The first is the addition of a new Article IV providing for close cooperation with NATO. It states:

> Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staff of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

The second provision amends Article VII of the Treaty (renumbered as Article VIII) to provide for the

of new German military forces. On the other hand, any move German rearmament acceptable to France because it was accompanied by a British commitment to fight automatically in the organization and a treaty pledge to maintain forces on the Continent. This was accompanied by a German pledge to expand-upon force levels and restrictions on certain armaments plus the fact that German admission to NATO was provided for.

The most important provisions for modifying and completing the revision of the Brussels Treaty were contained in four protocols. The first protocol begins in Article 1 by recognizing the admission of West Germany and Italy to the organization. In Article II, the preamble to the Treaty is modified by deleting the ala ef concerned action "in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" and substitutes the object of "promoting the unity and encouraging the progressive integration of Europe." Then follow the three main provisions of the protocol. The first is the addition of a new Article IV providing for close cooperation with NATO. It states:

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The second provision amends Article VIII of the Treaty (renumbered as Article VIII) to provide for the

creation of a new body to be known as the Council of the Western European Union. The Council was to concern itself with matters related to execution of the Treaty and was to exercise its functions continuously. The third provision inserted a new Article IX establishing the Western European Union Assembly. It states:

> The Council of the Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.[14]

Article II(b) of the Final Act of the London Conference provided that the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty should become "a Council with powers of decision." The new Article VIII of the amended Treaty provided that the Council of Western European Union is created

> . . . for purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer cooperation between the Parties and with other European organizations . . . . [and] to consider matters concerning the execution of the Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

Voting in the Council was to be decided by unanimity, a two-thirds majority, or a simple majority on various matters as specified in the subsequent protocols. In any

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[14] Ibid., p. 39.

creation of Article 236 to be known as the Council of the Western European Union. The Council was to concern itself with matters related to execution of the Treaty and was to observe its functions consistently. The third provision inserted a new Article IX establishing the Western European Union Assembly. It stated:

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[14] Ibid., p. 39.

matter not covered by a specific provision, the rule of unanimity would apply.[15]

The membership of the Council of the WEU consists of the Foreign Ministers of the member states. Although there is a provision stating that the Council will exercise its functions continuously, it is obvious that Foreign Ministers could not meet in continuous session; therefore, in the absence of the Ministers, the Council is to consist of the member states' ambassadors resident in London plus an Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office. In the latter case, the meetings are chaired by the Secretary General.[16]

Protocol II is concerned with "Forces of Western European Union." Certainly from a military point of view and in many respects from a political point of view, this protocol is the most important because it places upper limits on the size of land and air forces the member states will maintain on the European Continent during peacetime. The limits for Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are the same as those laid down in the Special Agreement annexed to the EDC Treaty. Luxembourg's limit is one regimental combat team. The upper limit on

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[15] Ibid.

[16] A. H. Robertson, European Institutions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 132.

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The membership of the Council of the WEU consists of the Foreign Ministers of the member states. Although there is a provision stating that the Council will exercise its functions separately, it is obvious that Foreign Ministers could not meet in continuous session; therefore, in the absence of the Ministers, the Council is to consist of the member states' representatives resident in London plus an Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office. In the latter case, the meetings are chaired by the Secretary General.[15]

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[14] Ibid.

[15] A. H. Robertson, European Institutions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 113.

Great Britain's Continental Forces is four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force.[17] Article VI to this protocol contains the British commitment, first made by Sir Anthony Eden during the London Conference, that for the duration of the Treaty the United Kingdom:

> . . . will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now supplied to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, regards as having equivalent fighting capacity.[18]

The British commitment, however, is qualified by the statement that, although the United Kingdom has agreed

> not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decisions in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom Forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will . . . invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained.[19]

While this British pledge did not increase the existing British forces in Europe and, in effect, made no real physical change in the existing situation, the importance

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[17] United States Department of State, London and Paris Agreements, op. cit., p. 42.

[18] Ibid., p. 44. [19] Ibid.

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[17] United States Department of State, London and Paris Agreements, pp. cit., p. 42.

[18] Ibid., p. 44. [19] Ibid.

of it lies in the fact that Great Britain here committed herself to a certain measure of majority rule in a European organization. The British action was interpreted by some as follows:

> By taking this "formidable" decision the United Kingdom turned its back on its traditional policy and threw in its lot with the Continent. The importance of the move lies not only in the commitment to maintain British forces on the Continent, but much more in the willingness to accept a majority decision as to the length of time they will be stationed there.[20]

In addition, the British pledge certainly did much to reassure the French public in their uneasiness about German rearmament.

Protocol III and its four annexes recorded the agreement of the other WEU members with the Declaration of the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany that Germany would not manufacture in its territory, atomic, biological, or chemical weapons. Germany further pledged not to produce long-range or guided missiles, large warships, or strategic bombers without the consent of a two-thirds majority of the Council of WEU. In the same protocol, the other members agree that their stocks of various weapons shall be subject to control, but these were not at all as restrictive as the pledges required of Germany.[21]

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[20] Robertson, op. cit., p. 133.

[21] Ibid., pp. 51-57.

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[20] Schwartzkopf, op. cit., p. 133.

[21] Ibid., pp. 31-37.

The fourth protocol provides for the establishment of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which is charged with ensuring that the obligations incurred on the manufacture of certain types of armaments in Protocol III are observed. The Agency is responsible to the Council and subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of WEU. The Agency is empowered to examine statistical and budgetary information, and to carry inspections of government-controlled defense establishments.[22]

The general framework into which WEU was placed was provided by the Brussels Treaty Organization created in March, 1948. The Brussels Treaty, to which Great Britain, France, and the Benelux Countries were parties, was a "treaty of economic, social, and cultural collaboration and collective self-defense," and was concluded for a fifty-year period. Significant among the commitments contained in the Treaty is Article IV which deals with collective defense as follows:

> If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.[23]

This is a much more direct and compelling obligation than

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

The Senate practical problem for the reconciliation of the Agency for the Control of Armaments, which is charged with ensuring that the obligations imposed on the manufacturers of certain types of armaments in Protocol III are observed. The Agency is responsible to the Council and reports to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General of WEU. The Agency is empowered to examine statistical and budgetary information, and to carry inspections of government-controlled defense establishments.[12]

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

that contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that each partner will, in the event of attack, take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."[24]

Under the terms of the Treaty, an organization was established to carry out its functions in the defense, economic, social, and cultural areas. However, the BTO soon lost most of its relevance in the defense field with the creation of NATO in 1949. The defense machinery created prior to NATO became the machinery for the Western Regional Planning Group, one of five regional planning groups established by the North Atlantic Council.[25] One month after the creation of the BTO, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation came into being and thereby took over the responsibilities of the BTO in the economic field. Thus being shorn of its two most important areas of activity, the BTO was left with its duties in the social and cultural areas. The organization accomplished a great deal in these areas, initially; however, with the creation of the Council of Europe (COE), in 1949, it acquired a competitor for its remaining areas of competence.

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[24]North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook (Utrecht: Bosch, 1963), p. ii.

[25]Robertson, op. cit., p. 209.

that contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty which states that each participant will, in the event of attack, take such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force."[24]

Under the terms of the Treaty, no organization was established to carry out the functions in the defense, economic, social, and cultural areas. However, the ETO soon lost most of its reference to the defense field with the creation of NATO in 1949. The defense machinery created prior to NATO became the machinery for the Western Regional Planning Group, one of five regional planning groups established by the North Atlantic Council.[25] The month after the creation of the ETO, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation came into being and thereby took over the responsibilities of the ETO in the economic field. Thus being stuck of its two most important areas of activity, the ETO was left with its duties in the social and cultural areas. The organization accomplished a great deal in these areas; initially however, with the creation of the Council of Europe (COE), in 1949, it acquired a counterpart for its remaining areas of competence.

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[24]North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The NATO Handbook (Paris: Author, 1963), p. 13.

[25]Kaiser, Ibid., p. 109.

It was into this existing, but less than dynamic, framework that WEU was molded with some major revisions as described in the Paris protocols. The new organization thus started out with a dubious legacy from its parent organization which certainly did not strengthen its chances for a meaningful existence. In addition, it is obvious that WEU was an organization created in haste, a second-best choice seemingly forced on its member states by circumstances rather than by choice. In view of the events which led to its creation and the hidden pressures which stimulated it, the charge of stop-gap measure or crisis choice certainly contains some credibility. However, in spite of its shaky foundations, WEU has survived and has done a credible job in so doing.

The most important change which took place in the structure of the BTO when it was transformed into the WEU was the addition of a parliamentary assembly which would provide the legislative scrutiny for the new organization. Because of the casual nature of the reference by which the Assembly of the WEU was created, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the Ministers of the seven powers who shaped the new organization intended that the WEU Assembly would meet briefly before or after the meetings of the Consultative Assembly to discuss the subject of armament control.

However, this proved to be a significant underestimation of the parliamentarians' desires to carry out the responsibilities they felt they were charged with.

Article V of the first protocol provided for the body that was to become the Assembly of the WEU in the following brief manner:

> The Council of WEU shall make an annual report on its activities, and in particular concerning the control of armaments, to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.[26]

Thus, in a single reference (which became Article IX of the amended Treaty), a parliamentary body was established to which the Council was, in a limited sense, responsible because of the requirement to submit an annual report. The desire to create a body which would exercise some measure of parliamentary control over the activities of the organization appears logical and justified; however, the absence of defining parameters within which the body was to operate appears quite strange. Normally, when a new institution or inter-governmental organization is established, the establishing treaty or document clearly defines the following points about the organization:

1. Its general composition and its powers in the executive and legislative sense.

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[16] United States Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 2064, "Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty," Article V, p. 2.

2. The procedures to be followed by the organization.

3. The privileges and immunities of its members.

4. How the organization will be financed.[27]

Lengthy sections of the documents establishing the Council of Europe and the ECSC were devoted to defining clearly such items; however, the Assembly of the WEU had no such help or restrictions to guide it.[28] Because of this unique situation, the Assembly experienced much difficulty in the first few years of existence in defining its functions and its relationship with the Council.

When the Assembly met for the first time on July 5, 1955, its first order of business was the quite novel one of defining the parameters within which it would operate. The Assembly drafted a charter and a set of rules of procedure which were introduced at the October meeting of the First Session of the Assembly.[29] The draft proposals were modified by certain amendments in April, 1956, at the Second Session, after which the Charter was adopted in its final form.[30] The first article of the Charter indicates

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[27]Robertson, op. cit., p. 138.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Document 3 in Proceedings of the Assembly of The Western European Union, First Session, October, 1955, pp. 178-181. [Hereafter referred to as Proceedings.]

[30]Document 9, Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1956, pp. 34-35.

5. The procedures to be followed by the committees.

3. The principles and immunities of its members.

4. How the organization will be financed.[27]

Lengthy sessions of the Secretaria verbalizing the Council of Europe and the ECSC were devoted to defining clearly each items; however, the Assembly of the ECSC had no help or restrictions to undue it.[28] Because of this unique situation, the Assembly experienced much difficulty in the first few years of existence in defining its functions and its relationship with the Council.

When the Assembly met for the first time on July 8, 1953, its first order of business was the quite novel one of defining the procedure within which it would operate. The Assembly drafted a Charter and a set of rules of procedure which were introduced at the October meeting of the first Session of the Assembly.[29] The Rules of Procedure were modified by certain amendments in April, 1958, at the second Session, after which the Charter was adopted in its final form.[30] The first article of the Charter initiates

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[27]Robertson, op. cit., p. 136.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Decisions 3 in Proceedings of the Assembly of The European Coal and Steel Community, First Session, Strasbourg, 1953-54. (Hereafter referred to as Proceedings).

[30]Document V, Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1958, pp. 14-21.

the broad scope of power and responsibility the Assembly felt competent to grant itself.

> (a) The Assembly carries out the parliamentary functions arising from the application of the Brussels Treaty. In particular, the Assembly may proceed on any matter arising out of the Brussels Treaty and upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the Council.
>
> (b) The Assembly shall determine its own agenda in conformity with the provisions of paragraph (a) above and having due regard to the activities of other organizations.

Later in the Charter, there are indications that the Assembly has the power to: (1) "make recommendations or transmit opinions to the Council on any matter . . . falling within the terms of reference of WEU," and to pass resolutions, if considered appropriate, for transmission to governments' national parliaments, or international organizations; (2) to consider reports made by the Council, especially concerning the work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee; and (3) transmit written questions to the Council on "any matter relevant to the Brussels Treaty, to the protocols thereto and on any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion."[31]

It is obvious from this broad scope of power that the Assembly saw fit to grant itself that the parliamentarians were not going to be content with a minor role for

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[31]Document 3, Proceedings, First Session, October, 1955, p. 178.

the broad scope of power and responsibility the Assembly

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> (a) The Assembly should ask the Parliamentary Executive acting from its majorities of the Burmese Treaty. In particular, the Assembly may proceed on any matter arising out of the Burmese Treaty and upon any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion by the Council.
>
> (b) The Assembly shall determine its own procedure in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a) above and having due regard to the activities of other organizations.

taken in the Chamber, there are indications that the Assembly has the power to: (1) "make recommendations or transmit opinions to the Council on any matter . . . falling within the terms of reference of BTC," and to pass resolutions, if considered appropriate, for transmission to Parliament; (2) to consider reports made by the Council, especially concerning the work of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee; and (3) transmit written questions to the Council on "any matter relevant to the Burmese Treaty, to the procedure thereto and on any matter submitted to the Assembly for an opinion."[33]

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[33] Document 3, Procedures, First Session, October, 1958, p. 17A.

the organization or for themselves within the framework of WEU. This attitude on the part of the initial membership of the Assembly was to have two definite effects on the life of the organization. First, it created the sense of independence and responsibility which was to become a primary characteristic of the Assembly within the organization. Second, and equally important in trying to understand one of the main dilemmas of the WEU, the actions of the Assembly in ascribing to themselves broad powers of parliamentary inspection served to alarm the member governments. The Assembly's actions were perceived by some as an attempt to give the organization more power than the member governments had intended. This initial perception is certainly one of the bases for the continued non-support the organization was to receive from the national government.

The Charter provides that the Assembly must meet annually and in any special sessions which may be called by the President of the Assembly, requested by the Council, or requested by one quarter of the members. The regular sessions are held in Strasbourg and are normally timed to coincide with the meetings of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe (because WEU Assembly members are also members of that body). The Assembly consists of eighty-nine members, eighteen each from Germany, France, the United

Kingdom, and Italy; seven each from Belgium and the Netherlands; and three from Luxembourg.[32]

The President of the Assembly and six vice presidents are elected annually at the beginning of each regular session. These seven men form the Bureau of the Assembly which is responsible for preparing a draft agenda for each session as well as general administrative direction. The Assembly has four permanent committees, which are: the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, the General Affairs Committee, the Committee on Budgetary Affairs Administration, and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. The chairmen of these Committees, added to the membership of the Bureau, form the Presidential Committee which acts as a steering committee. The Presidential Committee adopts the agenda and provides the President with a broad view of the activities being carried on by the Assembly and its committees.[33]

Two unique constitutional features of the Assembly are the fact that it has a separate budget entirely apart from the main WEU budget, and it has its own independent Secretariat. The Assembly's budget is prepared by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and the Presidential Committee.

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[32] Ibid., p. 181.

[33] Ibid., pp. 181-196.

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[32]Ibid., p. 181.

[33]Ibid., pp. 181-186.

Once the President is satisfied, he submits the budget first to the Assembly and then to the Council. If the Council is not satisfied to the extent that it wishes to make any changes greater than 20 per cent on any subhead, then a meeting must take place between representatives from the Assembly and the Council.

The membership of the Assembly is organized into three main political groupings--Christian Democrat, Socialist, and Liberals--with some smaller unaffiliated groups. Official recognition is gained by any political group as soon as there are nine or more official delegates belonging to that group. Although, in theory, the basis for future European parties is being formed here, in fact, very slight progress along these lines appears to have been made. National parties have acted together much more than party groups on specific official positions taken by the Assembly.[34] This is not an unusual development, considering the very elementary progress made toward political integration in Western Europe. Certainly, if the integration movement picks up speed again, even the elementary multi-national party experience gained in organizations like the WEU and the Council of Europe will be invaluable.

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[34]Kenneth Lindsay, European Assemblies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 28.

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The Assembly's Charter provides the members of the Council and other Ministers of the member states with the right to be present at all Assembly sittings. When attending, they may be heard at their own request or at the request of the Assembly. There is also a provision for Council members and Ministers to attend committee meetings where they have the right to speak but they may not vote. Committees and individual Assembly members also have the right to address questions to the Council. However, replies may be refused by the Council or postponed when the Council feels a reply would be contrary to "European public interest." If no reply is received from the Council in a month's time, then the question plus the indication of non-reply is published by the Assembly.[35] A method of direct questioning of the Council through its representative appears implicit in the Charter's provision for presentation of the Annual Report. Upon conclusion of an oral presentation of the Report by the Chairman of the Council, the Charter provides that "representatives may raise matters in the course of debate, to which the Chairman of the Council may reply."[36]

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[35]Document 3, Proceedings, First Session, October, 1955, p. 191, Rule 45.

[36]Ibid., p 179 [Section V(f)].

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[34] Ibid., p. 172 Section V(3).

[35] Document 3, Proceedings, First Session, October, 1952, p. 151, Rule 45.

Frequent use of the right to question the Council, beginning with the Council's first Annual Report, has been made. Twenty-six questions were asked by the Assembly President at the request of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, and replies were received in less than two months. The Council has requested, however, that a clear distinction be made between committee questions submitted in connection with the Annual Report and questions of individual members. The Council has expressed a desire that only committee questions be considered during the general debate on the Annual Report. Other questions are to be discussed during separate debate or via another means. During 1955 and 1956, the precedent of personal presentation of the Annual Report by the Council Chairman was established; however, in no case were the replies of the President to questioning of such a nature as to concede any greater measure of political responsibility to the Assembly.[37] The Council has never admitted to a degree of political responsibility to the Assembly comparable to a government Minister's responsibility to his own national parliament, nor is it likely to in the present set of relationships which exist between the WEU and its member

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[37] M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 366-367.

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[37] M. Margerat Hall, NATO and the European Union (Syracuse [New York]: Syracuse U. Press, 1959), pp. 184-187.

governments. The WEU is strictly an intergovernmental organization in the view of the member states; therefore, any attempt, on the part of the Assembly, to make the Council responsible to it, in the normal democratic executive-legislative relationship, is viewed as being beyond the bounds of the commitment incurred when the London and Paris Agreements were agreed to.

Because the Assembly was left free to determine its own areas of competence and its relationship with the Council, a certain amount of friction has always existed between the two bodies. When Mr. Spaak addressed the first meeting of the Assembly in July, 1955, on behalf of the Council of Ministers, he made certain suggestions to the Assembly to the effect that the Assembly should not be too ambitious with respect to the powers and privileges it claimed. Near the end of his speech, he commented:

> The Council of the Union has not wished to force its views on you. On the contrary, we are determined to leave you the greatest possible freedom, relying on your personal experience and your wisdom; but we feel justified in putting a few suggestions before you.[38]

However, the Committee on Organization, chaired by M. von der Goes von Naters, drew up the Charter, appeared to pay little heed to Mr. Spaak's advice. The Council was not entirely pleased with the draft Charter and particularly

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[38] Proceedings, First Session, July, 1955, p. 24.

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[39] Proceedings, First Session, July, 1953, p. 24.

with one proposal suggesting the Assembly make provisions for "a vote of general disagreement" with the Council.[39] The provision which was, in effect, an attempt to provide for votes of no confidence or censure similar to the prerogative held by the ECSC Common Assembly over the High Authority read as follows:

> A motion to disagree to the report or to a part of it, shall be tabled in writing by at least ten Representatives.
>
> The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has been tabled, shall require a majority of the Representatives to the Assembly.[40]

This controversial proposal caused a storm of debate when the draft Charter was presented. Those opposed to the measure felt the proposal offered no positive gain because the Assembly was powerless to remove the Council from office if it did pass a vote of no confidence. The proposal was accepted by the Assembly after the debate and was a source of concern in the member governments because it demonstrated a very clear difference of opinion between the governments and the Assembly as to what the relationship between Council and Assembly should be.

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[39] Robertson, op. cit., p. 139.

[40] Proceedings, First Session, October, 1955, p. 179 [Section V(h)].

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[39] Robertson, op. cit., p. 139.

[40] Proceedings, First Session, October, 1952, p. 179 (Section VIII).

The Council's view of this action was presented by the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. Beyen, when, in his capacity as Chairman of the Council, he presented the Annual Report a few days later. First, he acknowledged the duty of the Assembly to reflect public opinion, as follows:

> The voice of public opinion in our countries can make itself heard through the Assembly, and on the other hand, the Council has a forum where it can explain its activities to that public opinion.
>
> When we speak of "public opinion" we think of the combined public opinion in our countries, and this is a very important point.
>
> Western European Union is not a community of countries in the sense of the Coal and Steel Community. It has no executive organ responsible to a common Parliament. The Council of Ministers of Western European Union consists of Ministers who are each of them responsible to their national Parliaments for what they do in their capacity as members of that Council. Therefore, they cannot be responsible also, in the Parliamentary sense of the word, either individually or collectively to the Assembly of WEU. Therefore, your Assembly is a consultative Assembly.
>
> The importance of this consultative capacity is far from negligible. Though it does not invest the Assembly with actual power over the Council of Ministers it can exert a great deal of influence.[41]

Mr. Beyen then went on to explain why the Council felt it unwise for the Assembly to consider the use of votes of no confidence or censure. After first explaining that such an action could not effect a physical removal of

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[41] Ibid., p. 155.

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[1] Ibid, p. 152.

the Council members or the Council Staff and might possibly have no effect at all, he went on to warn:

> If, however, it would remain without effect at all, the relations between the Assembly and the Council would be severely jeopardised. The Council would have to take any specific advice of the Assembly into very serious consideration. It could never completely ignore such advice, and the least it should have to do is to talk matters over, but it would almost certainly be bound to ignore a general vote of disagreement or censure. This would create a situation which should be carefully avoided in the interest of European cooperation.[42]

The Assembly's rebuttal and reaction to Mr. Beyen's interpretation of the Assembly's proper role came from M. von der Goes von Naters (Chairman of the Committee on Organization) in the following manner:

> The second point which seems to cause the Council anxiety is the danger of confusion between a motion of censure and the "motion to disagree" which is mentioned in the Charter . . . . We are a realistic body composed of experienced and realistic Members of Parliament knowing full well where their powers lie and where they come to an end.
>
> If the Minister believes, and I do not think he does, that only motions of approval should be allowed, then I am bound to say quite frankly that an Assembly of that kind would be of no interest to me.
>
> Our purpose in doing so (including the motion to disagree) was to impose certain limitations of a self-evident democratic right: the right to disagree as well as agree.[43]

In spite of Mr. Beyen's observation and after a joint meeting of the Council and representatives from the

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[42] Ibid., p. 154. [43] Ibid., p. 158.

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have no effect at all, be very ill to pursue:

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[42] Ibid., p. 134. [43] Ibid., p. 139.

Assembly to review the draft Charter, the provision for motions to disagree remained. The only modification which resulted was the Assembly's assent to a Council request that a motion to disagree must relate specifically to the content of the Annual Report and not to more general dissatisfaction. The provision was amended by the Assembly on April 23, 1956, to read:

> A motion to disagree to the content of the report, or to a part of the report, shall be tabled in writing by at least ten Representatives.[44]

In addition to the controversial subject of "the motion to disagree," there were other powers, although of lesser importance, the Assembly granted to itself which served to irritate the Council, the member States and in some cases the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Because the Assembly of the WEU is, in reality, a consultative Assembly, in spite of the dislike of the term by that body, its assumption of a measure of independence greater than the Consultative Assembly has led to a certain amount of jealousy. Some of the powers in question are: (1) the right of the President to convene extraordinary sessions of the Assembly without the prior consent of the Council under Article III; (2) the power of the President to transmit resolutions direct to the member governments,

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[44] Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1956, p. 44.

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[44] Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1950, p. 44.

parliaments, and other international bodies under Article V; and (3) the powers of the Assembly to hear officials and to appoint committees of investigation.[45]

Thus, it is obvious that the Assembly of WEU has attempted to develop its areas of competence and powers of action to a much greater degree than it would appear the designers of this body had envisioned.

Whether these actions on the part of the Assembly served the best interest of the organization as a whole in view of its goals as laid down in the Paris Agreements is certainly open to debate. There is certainly a direct connection between the Assembly's attempts to justify and carry out its own view of its powers and the lack of support the organization has received from the member governments. If the Assembly had been more docile and acquiescent toward the Council's admonitions concerning the Assembly's range of power, perhaps the Assembly would have been more readily accepted by the member states; however, such an occurrence seems to have been highly unlikely. The fact that the member states did not feel it to be in their interests to make WEU a broader and more powerful organization, coupled with the diverting of the integrationists' efforts toward the Common Market, certainly supports this view.

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[42]Robertson, op. cit., p. 143.

It would appear logical then that, if the Assembly had not been adamant in its attempts to secure a broader role for itself, it would have been relegated to an even remoter position among the European organizations than it has enjoyed. Furthermore, by continuing to work for what it considered its proper role to be, the Assembly has contributed significantly to the cause of European integration both in the political and military spheres. Because of the environment in which it has operated and because a consensus for rapid movement toward integration has been lacking, the WEU has not been a spectacular success; however, its experiences can prove invaluable in the years ahead.

In addition to the Council (described in supra, p. 21 et passim) and the Assembly, there are two subsidiary agencies of the Council, the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, which should be examined briefly for a better understanding of the total effort of the organization. As provided for in Protocol IV, the Agency for the Control of Armaments was established by the Council during the first working session of the Council in May, 1955, and it commenced operations on June 21, 1955. The tasks of the organization as laid down in Article VII of Protocol IV are:

> (a) to satisfy itself that the undertaking set out in Protocol III not to manufacture certain types of

> armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed.
>
> (b) to control in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

Thus, the main tasks are to ensure the undertaking of the Federal Republic of Germany not to manufacture certain items is observed and to control the level of stocks of the listed items held by each member of the WEU on the Continent. To assist the Agency in carrying out its duties, each member is required to submit to the Agency an annual report of the total quantities of armaments required for its forces on the Continent under NATO authority and the current levels of such armaments.

In addition to the documentary material provided by the member governments, the Agency further obtains information from field inspections it conducts at military installations under NATO command (or forces earmarked for NATO) on the Continent and at armaments production facilities on the Continent. Although the Agency has done a commendable job in the areas in which it has been allowed to operate, it has never been accorded full inspection rights, nor has it been provided with complete documentary evidence by the member states.

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One difficulty with which the Agency has had to contend is the decision by the member states to consider the level of armaments fixed in the Paris Agreements as applying only to those armaments under NATO command. In its report to the Assembly in June of 1960, the Council described the activities of the Agency for the previous year as follows:[46] on the one hand, continued control of conventional armaments using the methods developed during previous years; while, on the other hand, a continued inability to exercise real or complete control in certain sectors since two important legal instruments had not come into force. The legal instruments referred to, which were signed in Paris in 1957 and were still not operable in 1965, will expand the Agency's area of control to include all internal defense and police forces and will facilitate the Agency's dealings with private manufacturers in the armaments field.

Despite the fact that the WEU is given a primary function of ensuring that force levels agreed upon in the Treaty are not exceeded, another of its main problems has been one of trying to encourage the member states to build up their forces to the agreed-upon levels. Great Britain, in particular, is a prime example of a member state deciding unilaterally to reduce its forces on the Continent

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[46]Document 159, Proceedings, June, 1960, p. 19.

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(will be more fully discussed later). To complement British actions, France has been continually guilty of using legal loopholes to avoid subjecting some of its forces to WEU scrutiny. France, initially, claimed her atomic bombs were being made for experimental purposes and were not for "production"; therefore, they did not come under the Treaty. Since France has definitely moved into the "production" stage, she has refused to submit to the Council's judgment with respect to levels of nuclear weapons.[47]

For obvious political and military reasons, the only member state which has consented to fairly rigid application of the Treaty provisions is the Federal Republic of Germany. Although, in Germany's case, restrictions have been relaxed in order to allow her to build larger submarines as recommended by SACEUR.

In view of the foregoing discussion, it would appear that the Agency has met with only partial success which is quite correct; however, this does not detract from the contributions made by the Agency in the field of arms control. The effective operation of WEU's functions is directly related to the amount of political consensus existing in the member states. Considering the amount of consensus WEU

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[47]Michael Curtis, Western European Integration (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 107.

[47] Richard Curtis, Masters Successful Diplomacy (New York: Hopkins and Row, 1962), p. 107.

has had in the field of arms control, it has done a creditable job in this field, particularly with respect to conventional weapons. The consensus among the member states is growing, as is evidenced by the fact that of the legal instruments needed for more effective operation of the Agency mentioned earlier--one was completely ratified by late 1964 and the other lacked only two states' consent.

The experience gained by WEU in the field of arms control will certainly be invaluable to any further movement in that field on the global scale. A global system would certainly have to differ in many ways from that of WEU, but the groundwork done in WEU can provide relevant information in a field where it is desperately needed. WEU has been able to show, on a very limited scale (considering the sectors they have been able to operate in), that arms control is not impossible in today's complex world.

The primary function of the Standing Armaments Committee is to increase the level of common production of weapons and to promote the standardization of weapons used by the member states. Because of WEU's relationship with NATO and the attempts of the NATO Organization to promote standardization and common production of weapons throughout the Alliance, WEU's work in this area has been logically overshadowed by NATO. There have been suggestions from the United States to merge the WEU Committee with NATO because

the United States does not like the idea of negotiations on common production of weapons to which it is not a party.[48] The WEU, however, has not seen fit to make such a move although it does work very closely with its NATO counterpart.

The concept for a committee of this kind was first introduced by the French government during the London Conference. France submitted a draft directive on the production and standardization of armaments which sought to establish common standards for the armaments of the participating countries. The idea received a favorable reception and later during the Paris Conference, a resolution to convene a Working Group to study Agreements. A favorable recommendation from the Working Group to the Council resulted in that body's decision to establish a Standing Armaments Committee.[49]

The motivation for the original French proposal and the consensus it gathered from the other members of WEU came primarily from two sources. First was a general belief that standardization was a justified and worthwhile goal in itself. The second source, and no doubt the primary one in the minds of the French government, was desire to impose even tighter restrictions on German rearmament. The

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[48] Ibid., p. 108.

[49] Robertson, op. cit., p. 134.

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[48]Ibid., p. 109.

[49]Robertson, op. cit., p. 124.

original French proposal envisaged a sort of "armaments pool" contributed to and drawn upon by all members but under the control of a joint body.[50] The actual Committee which was established was obviously not exactly what the French had in mind. The Committee's main area of success, although limited, has been in the field of new equipment. With regard to older equipment and methods of production, the Committee found:

> . . . that there is little chance of aiming at efficacious joint production of existing equipment. The producer countries, and even the purchasing countries, are generally too far committed for any attempt at a bringing together of a present positions of the different countries to have a reasonable chance of success.[51]

The use made of the Committee by the member states has been the subject of continual debate in the Assembly. A review of the debates held concerning the Council's annual report on the Committee reveals an annual plea by the Assembly for the member governments to support the work of the Committee. These pleas, however, have gone unheeded for the Council's report in 1964 indicated there was nothing new to report--many of the subcommittees did not even meet during the year. So long as the member states continue to

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[50] Ibid.

[51] Document 79, Proceedings, Fourth Session, April, 1958.

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Documents 29, Recommendation, Fourth Session, Assembly, 1952.

conduct their negotiations on standardization in bilateral or multilateral negotiations outside WEU, the prospects of the Committee becoming an important and effective body are remote. If, however, there is significant movement toward integration on a broader scale in Western Europe (i.e., Great Britain's becoming a full member of the Community Organization), then the Standing Armaments Committee may enjoy a new importance.

CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF WEU IN WESTERN DEFENSE

As laid down in the legal documents which created it, the WEU was given a primary function in the field of Western defense and secondary functions in the areas of economic, social, and cultural cooperation. In addition, WEU was to provide a solution to the Saar problem. Gradually and very logically, WEU has given up its legal claim to act in the fields of its secondary functions, and it has turned over any work started in these areas to other European organizations more logically equipped to handle these functions.

The successful solution of the Saar problem outside the WEU framework in 1955 was one of the first losses suffered by the WEU. The ownership and control of the Saar had been a constant source of friction in Franco-German relations for many years; and, as a result, the French Parliament laid down as one of its conditions for approving German rearmament that a mutually-agreeable solution be found for the Saar. An agreement was worked out between France and Germany under which, subject to a Saar referendum, the Saar was to be "Europeanized" within the framework of the WEU. The people of the Saar, however, felt differently and rejected the WEU solution in favor of incorporation into West Germany. The admission of the Saar into

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The successful solution of the Saar problem outside the WEU framework in 1955 was one of the first losses suffered by the WEU. The ownership and control of the Saar had been a constant source of friction in French-German relations for many years, and, as a result, the French Parliament laid down as one of its conditions for approving German rearmament that a mutually-agreeable solution be found for the Saar. An agreement was worked out between France and Germany under which, subject to a Saar referendum, the Saar was to be "Europeanized" within the framework of the WEU. The people of the Saar, however, fully rejected the WEU solution in favor of incorporation into West Germany. The admission of the Saar into

West Germany by a Franco-German agreement on January 1, 1957, thus ended WEU responsibility with respect to the Saar.[1]

The main reason the WEU was given responsibility in the cultural and social areas is that these functions were inherited from the Brussels Treaty Organization. The logic in passing on these areas of responsibility to the WEU seems a little faulty today, considering the activities of organizations such as the Council of Europe. No doubt the programs of the BTO in operation in 1954 supplied the main rationale for passing the functions on to WEU, in spite of the excellent opportunity presented for a further clarifying of the primary roles the various European organizations should have been playing. But the members of the new WEU Assembly, being anxious both firmly to establish the organization on as broad a front as possible and certainly wishing to fulfill the terms of the Treaty creating WEU, rapidly established WEU committees for the cultural and social areas to carry on the work of the BTO. WEU's work in these fields lasted approximately five years, during which the Council of Europe and others were constantly decrying the duplication of effort which was being created

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[1]M. Margaret Ball, NATO and the European Union Movement (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 382.

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by WEU's continued activity in these areas. Although the WEU's work in the cultural and social areas was certainly a genuine contribution to the total European effort, logic finally prevailed in 1960 when the Assembly consented to transfer its operations in these fields to the Council of Europe. That the transfer took so long to occur is certainly a (dubious) credit to the "literalists" in the Assembly who consistently blocked such action in the early years. That the transfer was logical and necessary to reduce duplication of effort is certainly readily apparent. However, to use these reductions in functional responsibility as evidence that the WEU has become an organization without a real constructive purpose is to overlook the fact that the primary function assigned to WEU in the field of Western defense still exists and will probably grow more important in the future.

This is not meant to suggest that WEU's role in Western defense has been readily agreed upon or accepted by the member governments because quite the opposite is true. The most difficult problem the WEU has had to contend with has been that of establishing its area of competence in the field of Western defense to the satisfaction of the member governments.

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The fact that the seven members of WEU are also members of NATO has certainly made the job of exactly defining

WEU's role much more complex. Clearly, in the broad context of Western defense, NATO is the more powerful and more meaningful organization and the WEU is a less competent organization, which represents the views of only a seven member unit within the total NATO framework. The relationship between the WEU and NATO is necessarily complex because the two organizations have the same general goals and yet there is not a legal superior-inferior ordering. The obvious result and natural danger in having two intergovernmental defense organizations operating in the same general area is overlapping of functions and areas of operation. The dominant trend in the resolution of the problem of overlapping and/or duplication of effort with respect to the WEU and NATO has been one of the former relinquishing responsibility to the latter in those areas where the broader Western Alliance interests of the member states are best served. Basically, this has meant that WEU has gradually relinquished cognizance over certain strictly-operational military functions to NATO. As a result, WEU, as a defense organization, has no troops at its disposal, but this situation has not meant that the organization considers its role in the field of Western defense to have been invalidated.

The problem of determining the role of WEU in the field of Western defense to the satisfaction of the member

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The problem of determining the role of WEU in the field of Western defense in the relationship of the weak-

states has been the source of a continuing running debate in the Assembly since its opening session. The general legal basis for the WEU's role is laid down in the following sections of the amended Brussels Treaty. The Preamble states: "Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social, cultural matters, and for collective self defense." Article VIII goes on to state: "For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity the High Contracting Parties shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols, and Annexes." The Article then goes on to describe the functions of the Council, including the phrase which established the Assembly, and the guidelines for the Council in the event of a threat to the peace.

Recognizing that problems of overlap would exist by the very creation of a defense organization among seven members of the larger NATO organization, Article IV of the Treaty provides that "in execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them, shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." Also, Article IV provides that: "Recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information

and advice on military matters." It was within these declarations of purpose and the qualifying sections pertaining to NATO that the broad function of WEU in the area of Western European defense was to be established.

The problem of defining that function was among the first on the working agenda of the Assembly after WEU's formation. In 1956, the rapporteur of the Assembly's Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments gave a careful explanation of the problem and described the two predominant points of view on the problem which existed within the Assembly. The accepted Assembly view according to the rapporteur was that:

> Western European Union forms the European political group, which in military terms becomes a European nucleus within NATO. The difficulty is to spell out exactly in practical terms just what this phrase "European nucleus" means in relation to NATO.[2]

He then went on to describe the two points of view existing with regard to this definition.

The first group the rapporteur described as the "minimalists" because they interpreted WEU's role to be restricted to responsibility for the Armaments Control Agency and the Standing Armaments Committee. This group considered that NATO has the practical responsibility for

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[2]Document 28 in Proceedings of the Assembly of The Western European Union, Second Session, October, 1956, p. 11. [Hereafter referred to as Proceedings.]

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the organization of the defense of all Member States, including the seven Member States of WEU, in the widest sense, concerning strategic and tactical organization, agreement on troop commitments, etc.

The opposing view, termed the "maximalist" by the rapporteur, gave much more weight and significance to the phrase, "European nucleus." This group considered that WEU should have a much broader jurisdiction in defense matters because of the greater commitments to "collective self defense" in the Brussels Treaty than contained in Article V of the NATO Treaty. In addition, this group felt their stand was supported by the longer duration of the commitment incurred in the Brussels Treaty and in the political area that one of the objectives of the organization was "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."[3]

It is quite evident from the report of the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments and from the comments of the rapporteur that the maximalists held a firm hold on that Committee. The rapporteur in further clarification of the maximalist position went on to explain that the maximalists did not advocate duplication of the NATO common structure nor did they feel that collective representation of WEU in

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[3] Ibid.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

NATO was a practical goal. What they did want was recognition of WEU's right to a role of broad jurisdiction on European defense questions. The opinion of the Committee was that, as the one international parliamentary body with any jurisdiction at all over questions concerning the defense of the West, the Assembly of the WEU had a right to expect that it be kept fully informed on defense matters.

In the conclusions to their report to the Assembly, dated April 17, 1956, the Committee requested the Council:

> . . . not to take too restrictive a view about its (the Assembly) relative competence with regard to NATO. From the point of view of the Governments it is clearly right and practical that their general responsibility for security should be discharged through NATO. But this does not mean that they should not communicate to the only parliamentary Assembly competent in this field information concerning their activities within NATO, since they are in fact responsible to seven national parliaments and the members of our Assembly are chosen from those parliaments. What must be avoided at all costs is any narrow legalistic argument. By virtue of the Brussels Treaty we are competent to discuss these grave problems; we can do so only if we are properly informed; and if we discuss the issues in common, in a European Assembly, this forms a valuable corrective to the tendency in all national parliaments to look at plans involving considerable sacrifice solely from a point of view of immediate national advantage, rather than in the perspective of European security as a whole.[4]

The Council, however, was not ready then, nor would it be in the years that followed, to endorse the Assembly's

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[4]Document 12 in Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1957, p. 71.

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The Council, however, was not ready then, nor would it be in the years that followed, to endorse the Assembly's

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[4] Document 12 in Proceedings, Second Session, April, 1957, p. 12.

view that it should have complete access to all NATO information relevant to the seven Member States. The result was that the Assembly received a minimal amount of information (only unclassified) from NATO.

The Assembly's dissatisfaction with the kind and amount of information on defense matters submitted to it continued, and the result was a series of repeated demands to the Council for more information. In a lateral move, the Assembly invited the Defense Ministers of the Seven to attend the October, 1956, session of the Assembly. The Council viewed such an appearance as unwarranted and unwise; and, as a result, the Defense Ministers did not attend.[5] As it became evident that the Council felt it could not change its stand on the question of supplying more information to the Assembly, a general theme of acute frustration with the situation appeared in the general debate held. One member of the Assembly, voicing the sentiments of many, questioned: "Is Western European Union therefore to be denied the opportunity of discussing what I consider to be the most important reason of all for the bringing into existence of Western European Union? . . . . I may be quite wrong, but my impression was that the establishment of Western European Union was primarily for the purpose of

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providing a Parliamentary Assembly to discuss and to debate problems of defense."[6] He went on to say that, if the Council thought the only activity appropriate for the Assembly was the discussion of social and cultural matters, then one of two courses should be taken: either amend the Treaty specifically to provide the Assembly with the information it considered necessary, or dissolve the Assembly altogether.

Mr. Beyen, representing the Council, answered the maximalists' arguments in the following manner:

> The special character of the relations between the Council of Ministers and the Assembly derives from the character of the Council of Ministers as defined by the Treaty. Neither the Council nor the Assembly can change that character; it is only by changing the Treaty that it can be altered.
>
> . . . whatever the difficulties the Assembly finds in its relationship with the Council of Ministers, it should not start by thinking they are due to a lack of consideration or to evasive tactics. They are, I would say, in almost all cases due to the fact that the Council of Ministers is not a responsible body towards you.[7]

The debate ended with the adoption of Recommendation Six presented by the Defense Committee which urged that the Council urgently review their present interpretation of the amended Treaty of Brussels with regard to the functions of Western European Union in the defense field.[8]

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[6] Proceedings, Second Session, October, 1956, p. 106.

[7] Ibid., p. 111. [8] Ibid., p. 115.

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[6] Proceedings, Second Session, October, 1956, p. 104.

[7] Ibid., p. 111. [8] Ibid., p. 118.

The Council's answer to the Assembly's recommendation and their urgent demands came in the Second Annual Report of the Council of the Assembly in the spring of 1957. In the report, the Council recognized the legitimacy of the Assembly's demand for defense information which it was entitled to and the strength and determination of the Assembly to consider those broader aspects of defense policy which the Council still considered beyond its jurisdiction. The Council conceded that it had an obligation to furnish that information within the realm of the Assembly's jurisdiction. It further advocated more joint meetings between the Council and committee representatives from the Assembly. The Council's opinion with regard to the function of WEU in the defense field, however, had not changed. The Council felt that, although certain military tasks had been assigned to WEU under the Paris Agreements, "no steps were taken to re-establish military planning or command machinery as a part of WEU." The view of the Council was that the Paris Agreements "demonstrate that the seven WEU Powers considered that their mutual defense obligations could and should be fulfilled through NATO." Therefore, the WEU governments consider that the activities of the Council in the field of defense questions and armaments relate to:

(a) matters which the Contracting Parties wish to raise, especially under Art. VIII.

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(A) matters which the Contracting Parties wish to raise, especially under Art. VIII.

(b) the level of forces of member states (Protocol II).
(c) the maintenance of certain United Kingdom forces on the Continent.
(d) the Agency for the Control of Armaments.
(e) the Standing Armaments Committee.[9]

While the Council felt unable to provide information beyond that pertaining to the five areas listed, it did suggest that other information desired might best be obtained from the national parliaments of the member states. The Assembly accepted the suggestion as a possible solution to the problem and, in turn, made the following formal recommendation to the Council:

> That it communicate, beginning on September 1, 1957 to the Assembly on the first day of every second month the text of information concerning defense matters communicated by the Governments of the seven Member States to their national Parliaments and to the Committees of those Parliaments, in accordance with the provisions of Article VII (e) of the Charter.[10]

Although this plan was implemented later and initially appeared to soothe the frustrations of the Assembly, the calm was again broken on the subject by the Assembly in October, 1957, shortly after the Russian success with Sputnik. In a series of resolutions, the Assembly again took the offensive in recommending courses of action for Western policy to the Council.[11] The Assembly's dissatisfaction

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[9]Document 37, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, pp. 10-11.

[10]Ball, op. cit., p. 374.

[11]Ibid.

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[9] Document 97. Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, pp. 12-13.

[10] Watt, Jr. cit., p. 374. [11] Ibid.

resulted in a recommendation to the Council that in the future it shall carry out fully the responsibilities which are imposed by the Treaty and make full report thereon to the Assembly. The Assembly further requested the Council's opinion on the following proposal:

> That the Governments of the member states of Western European Union entrust their Permanent Representatives to NATO, acting as representatives of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the mission of keeping the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments informed concerning developments in those sectors where the WEU Council has at present transferred its functions to NATO.[12]

The Council again felt unable to accept the Assembly's proposed solution, but it did provide an alternate solution after consultation with the North Atlantic Council on the subject.[13]

An excellent example of the continuing attempts of the Assembly to play a meaningful role in the field of European defense concerns the British government's request to reduce the number of British military forces stationed on the Continent. By the spring and summer of 1956, the British government was seriously considering a general

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[12]Recommendation 18, Proceedings, Third Session, October, 1957, p. 324.

[13]Proceedings, Fourth Session, July, 1958, pp. 24-25. This section of the Third Annual Report describes the Council's attempts to solve the problem.

resulted in a recommendation to the Council that in the future it would carry out fully the responsibilities which are imposed by the Treaty and make full report thereon to the Assembly. The Assembly further requested the Council's opinion on the following proposal:

> That the Governments of the member states of Western European Union authorize their Permanent Representatives to SHAPE, acting as representatives of their Ministers of Foreign Affairs, with the mission of keeping the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments of the Council of Western European Union informed concerning developments in those sectors where the WEU Council has at present transferred its functions to NATO.[12]

The Council agreed with this request to accept the Assembly's proposal, but in due process of elaborate relation after consultation with the North Atlantic Council on the matter.[13]

An unsolicited example of the continuing attempts of the Assembly to play a substantive role in the field of European defense concerns the British government's request to reduce the number of British military forces stationed on the Continent. By the spring and summer of 1957, the British government was seriously considering a unilateral

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[12] Recommendation 19, Proceedings, Third session, October, 1957, p. 324.

[13] Proceedings, Fourth session, July, 1958, pp. 24-25. This section of the Third Annual Report describes the Council's attempts to solve the problem.

reduction and reorganization of her military forces.[14] The advent of the hydrogen bomb and apparent nuclear stalemate between the United States and the Soviet Union gave support to the growing conviction that no nation would be foolhardy enough to risk nuclear war. Beginning in 1954, the United States had been talking about force reduction and the equipping of NATO with tactical nuclear weapons. By 1956, U. S. defense planning appeared to have progressed to the stage where actual large-scale reductions of U. S. forces were contemplated. There were press reports on Admiral Radford's (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) proposal to reduce the existing U. S. forces from about 2,800,000 to 2,000,000 by 1960. Sources familiar with Admiral Radford's concept and views said Army forces overseas, including the five NATO divisions would be reduced to "small token forces."[15]

During the same period, the new Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" was being promoted with vigor by the Soviet Union. On May 14, 1956, the Soviet government announced that, in the absence of an agreement on general disarmament, they would unilaterally cut their armed forces by 1,200,000 men by May 1, 1957.[16] The British declaration,

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[14]Ball, op. cit., p. 94.

[15]The New York Times, July 7, 1956.

[16]Ball, op. cit., p. 94.

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[14] Hall, op. cit., p. 94.

[15] The New York Times, July 7, 1956.

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in this period when the two major powers felt they could afford to reduce the size of their military establishments, was an announcement on May 17, 1956, that Great Britain would reduce her armed forces from 772,000 to 700,000. By the end of July, a full-dress debate was held in the House of Commons covering such topics as replacing conscription with a smaller regular army and seeking additional ways to bring about substantial reductions in defense expenditures. By the beginning of 1957, the British proposals for a substantial force reduction had solidified to the point where the Government felt it necessary to consult with its WEU partners about the matter.[17]

On February 27, 1957, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn presented the British proposals in the WEU Council; a meeting which was attended by SACEUR, the United States and Canada, in addition to the member states. Mr. Lloyd emphasized the fact that the proposed reductions were primarily designed to improve the fighting capacity of Great Britain rather than decrease it. The only real decision made by the Council at the meeting was to postpone further discussion on the matter until after it had been presented to and discussed by the NATO Council.[18] During March, the NATO Council devoted four meetings to examining the matter.

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[17] Ibid., pp. 94-95. [18] Ibid.

[17]*Ibid.*, pp. 34-35. [18]*Ibid.*

On March 18, the WEU Council again took up its consideration of the subject. Both in the wider membership of NATO and among the members of WEU, there appeared to be a considerable difference of view as to the wisdom of increased reliance on atomic weapons accompanied by a reduction of conventional forces. General Norstad, SACEUR, had clearly stated previously that he was opposed to any reduction of NATO forces below the thirty division level agreed upon. Therefore, it is doubtful he added any favorable support for the British proposals.[19]

West Germany was particularly concerned about the prospect of the proposed British and probable American reduction of forces on the Continent and the fact that she was still expected to furnish NATO with twelve divisions. Reaction in the Bundestag was very strong against the proposed reductions; in addition to the segment who felt that reunification of Germany had been seriously prejudiced by German membership in NATO, there now existed a group who felt it unjust that Germany should be demanded to furnish twelve divisions while other members of NATO were considering force reductions. One result of this atmosphere was a decision by Chancellor Adenauer to reduce the term of

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[19] Ibid.

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[19] Ibid.

German conscription from eighteen to twelve months in a bill he was attempting to have the legislature pass.[20]

The decisions of the WEU Council on the matter of the British request were presented to the WEU Assembly in the following form:

> The Council recognized that the problems facing the United Kingdom were, in fact, common to all members of the Alliance and that these common problems called for a common solution within NATO. The seven Governments therefore agreed to recommend to the North Atlantic Council that they study urgently the proposals made by the German Chancellor for a new overall review of the resources of the Alliance covering:
>
> (a) military requirements and defense aims;
> (b) relationship between conventional and atomic forces and weapons;
> (c) relationship between modern armaments and economic and financial resources;
> (d) common production of modern weapons;
> (e) common solution of currency problems arising from the stationing of troops in member states.[21]

In addition, the Council also agreed the British government, "pending the result of this review by NATO, would carry out that part of their plans which related to the Financial Year 1957-1958 . . . . "[22] In effect, the reduction granted Great Britain amounted to a decrease of 13,500 men who were stationed in Germany. The forces which would be withdrawn

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Document 51, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, pp. 114-115.

[22] Ibid.

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[19] Ibid.

[20] Document 31, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957. pp. 114-115.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

from Germany were described as primarily administrative and anti-aircraft personnel which, as described by the Council, would raise the overall percentage of fighting units in Germany. The four divisional organizational structure of British Army units was to be maintained, and the total number of British aircraft in Germany was to be halved. However, the fire power of those remaining was to be increased with atomic weapons. The Ministers also agreed that any further decisions on the subject would be taken in October, 1957, after new discussions in WEU.

In the autumn of 1956, various members of the Assembly had begun to express their concern about the impending trend of troop reductions in Europe. In October, 1956, after calling for a review of defense requirements necessitated by the new weapons the Assembly recommended to the Council "that it be accepted that substantial conventional forces be retained in order to meet all eventualities."[23] In its Second Annual Report to the Assembly, the Council supported the recommendation as follows: "All member governments of WEU are, however, agreed that, whatever the final pattern of Western defense forces, substantial conventional forces must be maintained."[24] However, in spite of

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[23]Document 28, Proceedings, Second Session, October, 1956, Vol. III, p. 108.

[24]Document 37, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, Vol. II.

from Germany were described as perfectly satisfactory and anti-aircraft personnel which, as accepted by the Council, would raise the overall percentage of fighting units in Germany. The three divisional equivalents structure of British Army units was to be maintained, and the total number of British aircraft in Germany was to be halved. However, the file power of these remaining was to be increased with atomic weapons. The Ministers also agreed that any further decisions on the subject would be taken in October, 1957, after more discussions in NATO.

In the autumn of 1956, various members of the Assembly had begun to express their concern about the impending terms of Lyons reductions in Europe. In October, 1956, after calling for a review of defence requirements necessitated by the new weapons the Assembly recommended to the Council "that it be accepted that substantial conventional forces be retained in order to meet all eventualities."[23] In its second Annual Report to the Assembly, the Council supported the recommendation as follows: "All members (sic) of NATO can, however, appreciate that, whatever the final pattern of Western defence forces, substantial conventional forces must be maintained."[24] However, in spite of

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[23] Document 80, Proceedings, Second Session, October, 1956, Vol. III, p. 126.

[24] Document 97, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, Vol. II,

the apparent agreement between the two bodies, the action of the Council in giving its approval to the British request came under severe attack by the Assembly.

In a report presented to the Assembly on March 27, 1957, the Committee on Defense Questions and Armaments, after pointing out that it had not been consulted during the weeks of negotiation on the British request, insisted that:

> 1. That the effective defence of Western Europe on the basis of forward strategy requires:
>
> (a) an irreducible minimum land force of 30 divisions equipped with tactical atomic weapons;
> (b) a strategic nuclear striking force;
>
> 2. that a reduction of the still too weak ground forces at present stationed on the Continent of Europe would destroy the essence of the Western European defensive system, and is therefore not acceptable.[25]

The extreme dissatisfaction of the Assembly with the Council's action in this matter led to the presentation of the Assembly's first motion to disagree. While the final vote on the motion was thirty-one to twenty-seven with ten abstentions, thus failing to obtain the required absolute majority, the very introduction of the motion is indicative of the strong feelings of some members of the Assembly as to their rights and prerogatives with regard to questions

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[25]Document 38, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 27-28.

the apparent agreement between the two parties, the motion of the Council in giving its approval to the British expenditures came under serious attack by the Assembly.

In a report presented to the Assembly on March 17, 1957, the Committee on Defense Questions and Appropriations, after pointing out that it had not been consulted during the stage of negotiation on the British expenses, insisted that:

> 1. That the effective deterrence of Western Europe should forthwith be:
>
> (a) be irreducible minimum land force of 30 divisions supplied with tactical missile weapons
> (b) a strategic nuclear striking force;
>
> 2. that a reduction of the still too weak ground forces of peasant countries on the Continent as the Continent of the Western Europe would destroy the essence of the Western European defensive system, and is therefore not acceptable.[14]

The serious dissatisfaction of the Assembly with the Council's action in this matter led to the postponement of the Assembly's final action to January. While the final vote on the motion was finally-one to twenty-three with two abstentions, thus failing to obtain the required absolute majority, the very circumstance of the motion is indicative of the strong feeling of some members of the Assembly as to their rights and prerogatives with regard to questions

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[14] Documents de, Propositions, third Session, May, 1957, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.

of European defense. The following portions of that motion reflect the feelings of a substantial number of the Assembly's members.

> [The Assembly] . . . considering that the Council gave its approval before the consequences of the reduction of British forces had been sufficiently studied, and without adequately taking into account the provisions of Article 6 of Protocol II of the amended Brussels Treaty
>
> Expressing its deep concern at the fact that European security is weakened by reducing defence forces which are already inadequate;
>
> Considers insufficient the content of the Supplement to the Annual Report of the Council, and refers it back to be reexamined and a new report to be made to the Assembly.[26]

In this initial test of the Assembly's competence in defense matters, it was readily apparent that the member states were not going to be bound to nor controlled by the inter-governmental parliamentary body of the WEU. Great Britain's views with respect to her obligations toward the WEU were clarified further by the British White Paper of 1957, which was published without previously informing the Council of WEU.[27] The paper contained the outline of a revolutionary new defense policy for Great Britain which included the abolition of conscription in Great Britain in

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[26]Document 53, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, p. 119.

[27]Ball, op. cit., p. 98.

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> [The Assembly] . . . considering that the Council gave its approval before the commencement of the production of British fighters had been sufficiently drastic, and without adequately taking into account the provisions of Article 6 as protocol II of the Brussels Treaty

> Expressing its deep concern at the fact that European security is weakened by reducing defence forces which are already inadequate;

> Considers insufficient the content of the document to the second Report of the Council, and refers it back to the Council requesting that a new report to be made to the Assembly.[36]

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[36]Document 83, Proceedings, Third Session, May, 1957, p. 119.

[37]Holt, op. cit., p. 30.

addition to major reductions in the levels of her armed forces. The whole document was based on the conviction that any new war would be a nuclear war, that there was no real "means of providing adequate protection for the people of Britain against the consequences of an attack by nuclear weapons . . . ."

The Council's relative acquiescence in acknowledging the new British policy and that policy's implications concerning future requests by Great Britain to reduce her troops on the Continent was not received favorably by the Assembly. The Assembly's dissatisfaction stemmed from two major points. First, it was felt that the Assembly had been handed a "fait accompli" with respect to the question, thereby ignoring the prerogatives the Assembly felt it should enjoy in the field of European defense. Secondly, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction with the wisdom of the generally accepted plan for troop reductions and specifically with the British plans which the Council had approved. In spite of the Assembly's feelings on the matter, the reduction of British forces to 64,500 was effected. Later, in January, 1958, the Council agreed to a second reduction of British forces on the Continent to a level of 55,000 men to be accomplished in the fiscal year 1959.[28]

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[28] European Yearbook (The Hague: Martinus Nyhoff, 1960), Vol. VII, p. 175.

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[5] Documents Weekbook (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). Vol. XII, p. 178.

The actions of Great Britain with respect to her troop commitments to Europe affords an excellent example of the dilemma presented to the Assembly of the WEU. Although the organization is given the function of supervising force levels of the member states, the unilateral decisions of the member states with respect to those levels has obviated any real measure of supervisory control by the organization. Great Britain is certainly not the only member who has ignored the WEU in defense matters. France's actions with respect to her nuclear forces provides a more serious breach of promise as agreed to under the amended Brussels Treaty. Almost since the establishment of WEU, France has continually circumvented the supervisory role envisioned for the WEU. Without support by the larger member states, it is quite clear why the attempts of the Assembly to establish an acknowledged competence in the area of European defense have not been highly successful.

Yet, in spite of the lack of support the member states have given to the organization, the Assembly has continued the fight to establish its role by two general approaches. First, there have been annual appeals by the Assembly for the member governments to make use of and to acknowledge the WEU as an effective defense organization. Each non-concurrence by the Council to the continual Assembly demands for more information on defense matters and for

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a real recognition of their existence has resulted in stormy debates between Assembly members and the representatives of the Council. Secondly, within the bounds of the role the member states have been willing to grant the WEU, it has done a commendable job of providing the public forum for debate of general defense subjects.

In 1962, the Defense Committee of the Assembly published a report entitled "State of European Security 1956-1961," which describes in great detail the activities of the Assembly in the area of European defense.[29] The report offers substantial evidence that, in spite of the narrow role it has been assigned by the member states, the WEU is performing an important function in European defense. The Assembly has been addressed in open session by many of the leading political and military figures in European organizations. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), both in the person of General Norstad and of General Lemnitzer, has been almost an annual guest speaker. In addition, the Secretary General of NATO and the Defense Ministers from the member states have appeared before the Assembly. Following many of the open sessions, these key people in

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[29] Document 215, Proceedings, November, 1961, p. 9.

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[39]Document 213, Proceedings, November, 1961, p. 9.

European defense have consented to appear in closed sessions in order to discuss some of the more delicate problems.

The Defense Committee itself has been a most active element within the Assembly as it has sought to provide the entire body with expert analysis and organization of the information to which it has access. The Committee members have conducted numerous inspection tours of major defense installations throughout the seven country area. These visits, plus the information the member states have been willing to provide have given the Committee the material necessary for discussion of common European problems. These discussions and debates have led to the criticisms and constant recommendations by the Assembly addressed to the Council and the member governments.

At the conclusion of its lengthy report on European security in 1961, the Defense Committee, as it had done many times before, offered a series of recommended policies it felt necessary to enhance that security. The Assembly, after debating the report at length, accepted the general recommendations of the Defense Committee and forwarded them to the Council and the member governments. The points in the Recommendation were:

1. That the member governments bring up their armed forces to the full strength necessary to avoid nuclear war.

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2. That more progress should be made in the standardization of weapons and common production of armaments.

3. That NATO should be asked to revise its rulings on the provision of only unclassified information to the Defense Committee.

None of these recommendations were new because each of them had appeared continually in the recommendations coming from the semi-annual meetings of the Assembly prior to 1961; and owing to the peculiar environment WEU was operating in, each would continue to appear after 1961. The central theme of the Defense Committee's report was that if the members of the Western Alliance were willing to abandon "nationalistic concepts of defence in favor of common defence" and if that common defense was effectively "supervised by national and international parliamentary bodies," then the existing deficiencies in the Western defense system could be eliminated. The logic in this central theme is difficult to question if, in fact, the member states were still pursuing the goal of the best possible defense system in the face of a commonly-perceived danger and perhaps even more relevant--if the political consensus necessary for such additional losses of sovereignty were present.

Such was not the case in 1961 when the Council, and later the member governments, received the Assembly's recommendations and no major change has taken place since. One of the main problems underlying WEU's difficulties in

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establishing its role in defense matter, and it is a key factor in understanding WEU's general non use, is the fact that the creation of WEU coincided with the strengthening of the "community" movement of the Six in the mid-1950's. This factor, coupled with the British attitude toward the Six in the 1950's, the divergent French-American views on European defense, and the perceived lessening of the Soviet threat, have all contributed significantly to the WEU's dilemma. The caliber of WEU's work has been high in the field of European defense even if limited. According to a noted observer of the European scene, Mr. Kenneth Lindsay,

> . . . the successive reports of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments have been of a high standard; they have done a public service of exposing the weaknesses of NATO and in recording a disappointing lack of progress on armaments control in WEU.[30]

While conditions have not existed which would have allowed WEU to play a broader role in European defense, it has contributed significantly to the extent it has been allowed by the member governments. Its primary contribution in the broad sense has been to provide a public forum in which European defense matters can be discussed in a truly democratic manner. Although the Assembly is only able to recommend and has no real parliamentary control over

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[30]Kenneth Lindsay, European Assemblies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 28.

European defense, it has provided valuable experience toward developing a "European sense of responsibility."

And, as will be discussed in the last chapter, there are certain definite indications that the conditions which have prevented WEU from playing an influential role in European defenses are slowly changing. There exists the distinct possibility that the WEU may well become the European defense organization if the divisive tendencies in the NATO Alliance continue.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF WEU

In the preamble to the amended Brussels Treaty, the authors of the Treaty had declared their resolve:

> To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe.

It is from the Assembly's interpretation of this charge that the second broad area of the Assembly's activities have evolved--the attempt to create a political role for the WEU. One of the key questions which perplexed the first meetings of the WEU Assembly was the extent and nature of the political role envisioned for the Assembly by the authors of the treaties establishing the WEU. The question was one which had no simple answers. The Representatives could not easily discover what useful political role the new seven power organization could play in view of the broader organizations such as NATO and the Council of Europe, which were already in existence, and the vagueness of the treaties with respect to the matter.

Despite any clear-cut statutory basis, the Representatives did decide that the intent of the authors of the Treaty had envisioned a useful political role for the Assembly. Their rationale in making such a decision seems to have been based on two general assumptions. First, that,

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although the primary role of the Assembly was to provide parliamentary supervision for the defense activities of the member states that role would be encumbered by nationalistic attitudes the member states would exhibit toward extra national control. This prediction was both logical, considering the prevailing feelings about multilateral defense commitments in the mid-1950's, and, as has been discussed in Chapter II, the prediction was essentially correct. The second assumption tended to flow from the logic of the first, in that, if the Assembly's role in the defense area was going to be restricted to a degree, considering the inter-governmental nature of the organization, then the authors must have envisioned other additional duties for the Assembly.[1]

Evidence to back the Assembly's reasoning on the matter was offered by Mr. Pierre Mendes-France, the French Prime Minister, in a speech before the National Assembly during the debate on ratification of the Paris Agreements. During that speech, he made the following statement:

> Moreover, Western European Union is not competent, as is too often thought, in the military field alone: it is also competent in other and highly diversified fields--those of economics, commerce,

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[1]Paul Borcier, The Political Role of the Assembly of WEU (Paris: WEU Information Booklet, 1963), p. 6.

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[1]Paul Boncour, The Political Role of the Assembly of WEU (Paris: WEU Information Bureau, 1957), p. 5.

> and social questions--and its powers will be progressively extended if only by the pressure of the democratic assembly which is to be set up with it.[2]

The French Prime Minister's observations certainly implied that the role envisioned for the Assembly was one of an expanding nature--depending primarily on the initiative of the membership of the Assembly. He went on to observe:

> The contribution to the construction of Europe is infinitely more important to the future of our civilization than the military clauses of the agreements which are now before you.[3]

These comments by Mr. Mendes-France and the similarly optimistic statements of other European leaders concerning the potential role of the Assembly certainly strengthened the position of Assembly members who felt the Assembly must conduct an exhaustive search for its place in European affairs. The key phrase upon which the Assembly attempted to establish a significant political role for itself was that which called for the "adoption of the necessary measures to promote the unity and encourage the progressive integration of Europe." The fact that Great Britain had made a historic move toward the Continent under the terms of the Treaty by agreeing to maintain forces on the Continent was certainly a key element in this atmosphere

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of a perceived revival of the European integration movement. In many respects, the fate of the Assembly's success in the broader political context was then directly hinged to the degree of association Great Britain was to have with the Six.

The bright hopes of 1954-1956 for the political future of the Assembly, however, were soon dimmed by important changes which took place in the integration movement. The decision of the Six to renew their efforts toward integration by the "sector" approach led to the signing of the Hague Treaties which established two more supranational institutions--the Common Market and EURATOM. Great Britain, having refused the supranational approach through the ECSC and the EDC, maintained her position in refusing to accept the invitation to become a full member of the new organizations. The decision by the Six to shift back to the "Community approach" to integration and Great Britain's refusal to change her stand on supranational association with the Six sounded the death knell for any hopes of a broad influential political role for the WEU Assembly.

However, despite the change in support the Assembly experienced, it has, in fact, played a significant, although not major, political role in Western Europe. The Assembly continued to research and debate important

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questions of political significance for Western Europe even though much of this fine work went unnoticed or unanswered by the member governments. The General Affairs Committee of the Assembly has conscientiously explored the main political questions which have confronted Western Europe and has provided the Assembly with outstanding reports upon which it has based its continual flow of recommendations on these political issues. Yet, in spite of this effort on the part of the Assembly to play a meaningful political role, conditions, much the same as those which have circumscribed its efforts in the defense field, have prevented such an occurrence.

The contributions of the Assembly toward further European integration and resolution of European political problems, however, has been significant considering the role it has been allowed to play by the member governments. The experience gained by both the parliamentarians who have sat in the Assembly and the member governments who have been constantly harassed by recommendations of the Assembly will certainly form a valuable base upon which the next level of European integration will be leased. The experience of the Assembly, considering that it is the one assembly in which the broad political-security questions have been discussed openly, will certainly be invaluable to the

parliamentary body which seems destined to result from the various plans for rationalization of European assemblies.

There are two particularly significant political questions which the WEU has had a definite constructive influence upon. The first of these concerns the "bridge-building" role assigned to WEU once Great Britain decided that her long-range national interests dictated a closer association with the Continent through British membership in the "Community Organizations" of the Six. The other central political question in which the WEU has displayed a constant significant interest as exhibited by the running debate concerning it in the Assembly, and one which may result in the partial or total absorption of the WEU by other organizations, is the question of rationalization or simplifying the complex structure of existing European organizations.

The prospects for WEU's political role in Europe declined steadily from its optimistic heights in 1955 and early 1956. The attention of the Six was entirely diverted toward their attempts to create an acceptable expanded form of economic integration in the shape of a customs union. Because the negotiations on the Rome Treaties were absorbing much of the energy of the Six and because Great Britain assumed an opposite position with respect to that movement, the initial consensus concerning the WEU's prospective role

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The Prospects for WEU's Political Role in Europe

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was badly split--if not forgotten. Conditions had changed, and WEU suffered directly because of it. During 1957 and 1958, the political career of the WEU Assembly all but vanished as far as the rest of Europe was concerned. The primary political topic which received the attention of the Assembly was the rationalization of the European organization in the technical sense which will be discussed later in this chapter. Because of the split in its membership into the Six, plus Great Britain over the establishment of the Common Market, the Assembly was effectively denied the chance to play a part in questions of broader European importance. The year 1959, however, witnessed a gradual trend toward rapprochement between Great Britain and the Six and with it a new importance for the Assembly in the political field. Because Great Britain had been unable to convert the Six to her concept of a greater European association of thirteen or so nations, she gradually began searching for ways to narrow the gulf which had grown between them. The WEU offered the logical place in which Great Britain could promote her plans for "building a bridge" between the Six and her own partners in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Great Britain decided then to use the WEU as the vehicle through which she would attempt to resolve her differences with the Six.

Great Britain's decision to use WEU was heartily welcomed by the Assembly. At last, they were in a position to receive a measure of political recognition. Although many of the Assembly members were overly optimistic about the political benefits which would occur to WEU, the organization was being offered an opportunity to make a significant contribution to the cause of European integration. And there would certainly have been some incidental political status reflected on WEU if she was a prime contributor toward Great Britain's joining Europe.[4] The Assembly accepted the challenge in a sense and committed itself to its first major political battle in the context of the role it was allowed to play. This is not to suggest that without the WEU Great Britain could not have found ways to bridge the channel and conversely all of WEU's effort were to of no avail in the final decision--the point is that this particular set of circumstances offered the organization a new injection of purpose.

Following the defeat of EDC and the plans for a European Political Community (EPC) which accompanied it, and during the same period that WEU was organizing itself,

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[4]Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), Chapter VIII. In the chapter, the author presents a detailed account of the British government's attempts at "bridge-building."

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Following the defeat of EDC and the plans for a European Political Community (EPC) which accompanied it, and during the same period that WEU was separating itself

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[4]Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964), Chapter VIII. In the chapter, the author presents a detailed account of the British government's attempts at "bridge-building."

the advocates of European unity, under the leadership of Jean Monnet, again began searching for avenues which would lead them to their goal. Under Monnet's vigorous leadership the idea of European unity was given new substance and direction. The results of Monnet's work, which led to the Messina Conference and finally the Rome Treaties, came in the form of plans for the European Economic Community (EEC). Great Britain's reaction, however, was much the same as it had been toward the ECSC and the EDC in that she viewed this new plan of economic integration devised by the supranationalists of Europe with extreme skepticism. Great Britain did send an official from the Board of Trade to represent her at the Messina Conference, but his main purpose was to remind the "continentals" of the dangers which might result from dividing Europe. An additional task of the British representative was to inform the Europeans that if they were again contemplating a venture into supranational control, they could not expect Whitehall to participate.[5] In a November meeting of the conference, the British representative, Mr. Bretherton presented Great Britain's reasons for her apprehension about the impending economic venture. First, Great Britain feared any arrangement of the sort being discussed would collide with her

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[5]Nora Beloff, The General Says No (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1963), p. 74.

[illegible]

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[illegible]

Commonwealth commitments and Great Britain insisted that any arrangement arrived at in the Community concept must remain within the framework of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). That was the last official appearance of Great Britain at the negotiations because, after the statement of her position, Great Britain was no longer invited to the negotiations. Great Britain had nothing more to do either with the Rome Treaty negotiations from which came the Common Market and Euratom.[6]

Shortly after the group of experts from the "Six" began work on the final draft of the Rome Treaty, Great Britain suggested that the eighteen members of the OEEC examine the plans for a free trade area among them. The "Six" responded with an official request for a delay until they could finish the business at hand. Less than a year later, on March 25, 1957, the historic Treaty of Rome was signed. The initial British reaction to the establishment of the Common Market was continued skepticism and complacency. Whitehall comforted itself with the fact that France and Italy had failed to honor much less drastic obligations to liberate trade incurred under the OEEC. Therefore, the chances of success for the EEC appeared slight in British eyes.[7]

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 75.

Commonwealth countries and Great Britain instituted that any arrangement arrived at in the Community concept must remain within the framework of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). That was the last official appearance of Great Britain at the negotiations because, after the withdrawal of her position, Great Britain was no longer limited to the suggestions. Great Britain had nothing more to do either with the Seven Treaty negotiations from which arose the Common Market and Euratom.[6]

Shortly after the group of experts from the "Six" began work on the final drafts of the Rome Treaty, Great Britain anticipated that the eighteen members of the OEEC would join the plans for a free trade area among them. The "six" responded with an official request for a delay until they could finish the matters at hand. Less than a year later, on March 25, 1957, the historic Treaty of Rome was signed. The initial written reaction to the establishment of the Common Market was confirmed skepticism and nonchalance. Whitehall confronted itself with the fact that France and Italy had failed to honor much less execute obligations to liberate trade incurred under the OEEC. Therefore, the chances of success for the EEC appeared slight in getting off the ground.[7]

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[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 72.

The choices open to Great Britain, as stated by Mr. Alan Lennox Boyd, a leading member of the Conservative Party, were as follows:

> Some six European countries are seriously considering a customs union. We can do three things: remain outside, losing rich markets and sources of investment; go in, in which case we would lose our imperial preference system; or we can have some association with it which would give us the best of all worlds.[8]

In view of their proposals for a free trade area, the British choice was obviously the last one. As a means to their end, shortly after the Rome Treaty was signed, Great Britain sent a special emissary to the Continent with the task of converting the Europeans to the British concept of a free trade area. The emissary, Mr. Reginald Maudling, spent over a year on his assignment but met with little success in the capitals of the "Six."[9] During this period, an event occurred which was to be of importance to the British plan for a free trade area as well as to the entire complexion of the European political scene. The event was the rise to power of General de Gaulle in France.

At first, Great Britain welcomed the appearance of General de Gaulle because they believed he alone would demolish the "infant" EEC. However, they soon discovered that, in addition to accomplishing a near miracle in

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stabilizing the French political scene, the first project he demolished was the Maudling Free Trade Area plan. In November, 1958, some six months after his return to power, the General informed the press that France had rejected the Maudling plan.[10] British misjudgment of the General in this instance was less critical but in an ominous sense an antecedent of their misjudgment of him in 1962.

The final act of the Free Trade Area drama came in less than a month at a Ministerial Meeting of the Council of the OEEC. The British representative, President of the Board of Trade, Sir David Eccles announced that, if the six Common Market countries are prepared to extend to the rest of the OEEC the quota concessions they are making among themselves, Great Britain would offer similar advantages to all the OEEC countries. Sir David further declared that, if the Six postponed consideration of the British offer, Great Britain would have to consider defensive measures. The French reply was obvious when their representative, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, left the meeting with a comment to the press that France was not in the habit of negotiating under duress.[11] The British decision to resort to "defensive measures," which came in the form

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

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[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

of the European Free Trade Association, was certainly an ill-fated one considering the harm Great Britain suffered because of it.

The reaction to the British proposal among the rest of the Six was mixed. Belgium and Germany were interested because they saw the Free Trade Area (FTA) as a vehicle for marketing their industrial goods on a wider basis. Italy and the Netherlands were opposed to the plan because it provided no reciprocal concessions for their own products while allowing others to enter. Of course, the main opposition to the plan came from France who charged that Great Britain and her followers were seeking to obtain the benefits of an enlarged European market although they refused to pay the price the "Six" were willing to pay. Once France made her firm opposition clear, at the November meeting of the OEEC, the rest of the Six more or less fell into agreement with her.[12]

Shortly after the stormy OEEC meeting, Great Britain and the remaining European members of the OEEC gathered in a private meeting to discuss the situation. The end result was the formation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) which was set up on July 21, 1959. The convention

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[12]David Cottrell, Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 140.

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[12]David Cattrell, Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 160.

establishing EFTA for manufactured goods went into effect on May 3, 1960.[13] The organization was essentially based on a consolidation of trade policies among the seven member countries. As opposed to the EEC, the EFTA contained no supranational control features and no common external tariff. A scheme was set up for a lowering of tariffs on goods from member states (inter-EFTA trade) at a rate comparable to the EEC. The question of what constituted a nation's goods was attempted to be covered by a set of rules which determined the origin of the goods.

The formation of EFTA with its seven members and the existence of the EEC with its six members could not help but divide Europe into two rival economic groups. While the British were accused of deliberately forming the "Outer Seven" in retaliation against the attitude of the "Inner Six" it did not appear that the other members of EFTA had required much cohesion. A more balanced view would be to say that Great Britain was the leader and spokesman for EFTA. For the year following the break in communications between the two groups at the OEEC Ministers' meeting, the situation tended to grow steadily worse. Because both groups had been primarily concerned with enhancing their own positions, the communications between the two dropped

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[13] Ibid., p. 141.

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[13] Ibid., p. 141.

to a minimum. This lack of intercourse tended to solidify rather than mitigate the opposing points of view.[14]

The first nation to recognize the dangers and the futility of the situation and who felt itself in a position to do something about it was Great Britain. Following the General Election in October, 1959, by which the Conservatives returned to power, the British government set out on a deliberate campaign to find ways to improve relations and to strengthen political ties with the Six. One important factor which motivated Great Britain's policy at this time was the fact that the Six had begun to talk more about closer political ties among themselves. As a result of this situation, the last months of 1959 saw a renewal of official political contact between members of the Six and Great Britain. In November, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary, visited Paris, and Dr. Adenauer, German Chancellor, visited London. It was during this period that an understanding, due primarily to British initiative, was reached that more important use could be made of WEU.[15]

One of the first indications of this shift in emphasis of British policy came in a speech made by Mr. Profumo, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in the British

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[14] Camps, op. cit., p. 233.

[15] Ibid., p. 234.

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[14]Camps, op. cit., p. 233.

[15]Ibid., p. 234.

government to the Assembly of the WEU in December, 1959. During his opening statement, he confirmed Great Britain's position with respect to the EEC by saying:

> So let me repeat with all the emphasis I can and on behalf of the British Government . . . that we in Britain were sincere in our welcome for the Rome Treaties in 1957. We have supported it ever since, and will continue to support this experiment in European unity which is the Six. We believe it will succeed; indeed we think it is just as much in our own interests as it is in the interest of the whole western world that it should succeed.[16]

He went on to clarify Great Britain's position on whether Great Britain now felt it necessary to draw closer to the Continent, by saying:

> Whereas when WEU came into being we in Britain were determined to draw Europe closer together, now we are determined to draw closer to Europe.

On the subject of EFTA and Great Britain's intentions in helping to set up that organization, he stated: "It is no part of our policy to set up a club of the Seven in opposition to the Six. No indeed; we want the Seven to have Six-appeal!"[17] Mr. Profumo then went on to the subject of the proposed tri-monthly meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the Six for political consultations. He indicated that it was the hope of the British government that "if those

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[16] Proceedings of the Assembly of The Western European Union, Fifth Session, December, 1959, Vol. IV, p. 61. [Hereafter referred to as Proceedings.]

[17] Ibid.

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During his opening statement, he confirmed Great Britain's position with respect to the EDC by saying:

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[16] Proceedings of the Assembly of The Western European Union, Fifth Session, December, 1959, Vol. IV, p. 31. [Hereafter referred to as Proceedings.]

[17] Ibid.

consultations are going to go beyond the domestic affairs of the Six, they might immediately be followed by a meeting of the WEU. Council at ministerial level."[18] The objective of such meetings of the Council was to prevent a gap from growing up within WEU between Great Britain and the Six.

The answers of the Six to these British proposals were certainly far short of British expectations. The only commitment the Foreign Ministers of the Six made as a result of their November meeting was: "These consultations [among the Six] will be held without prejudice to those which take place in NATO and WEU. Wherever necessary these organizations will be kept informed on matters of interest to them."[19]

In spite of this rebuff to their two-edged suggestion of a more meaningful role for WEU, the climate of the British government opinion and public opinion during 1959 and 1960 was now even more strongly in favor of a closer association between Great Britain and the Continent. While it is obvious that the British government was attempting to use the WEU as one vehicle to bring about this closer association, the very fact that they were doing just that did offer the WEU the possibility of renewed importance.

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[18] Ibid., p. 62.

[19] Camps, op. cit., p. 235, fn.

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[18] Ibid., p. 87.

[19] Camps, op. cit., p. 232, fn.

During the period in which the final decision of the British government to apply for membership in the EEC was being formulated, several preliminary steps were proposed. Among these were numerous proposals that Great Britain join the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom prior to the major step of joining the EEC.

During 1960, the General Affairs Committee and, in turn, the Assembly of WEU became advocates of British accession to the European Communities. Once Great Britain had made her decision to apply for membership, the Assembly sought to use every means at its disposal to assist Great Britain in joining the Communities.[20]

The general topic of Great Britain's relationship to the Six was opened for debate in the Assembly in May, 1960, following a report by Mr. Conte, Rapporteur for the General Affairs Committee, on the behalf of that Committee. The report was significant because, in it, the Committee included a draft recommendation that member governments of WEU examine the possibility of the United Kingdom acceding as a full member of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).[21] The Committee's reasons for bringing up this

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[20]Borcier, op. cit., p. 32.

[21]Document 168, Proceedings, Sixth Session, June, 1960, Vol. I, p. 108.

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[20] Brutsch, op. cit., p. 32.

[21] Documents 1962, Proceedings, Sixth Session, June, 1960, Vol. I, p. 104.

certainly important but delicate subject were basically two. First, and perhaps the more obvious one, was that the WEU provided an excellent meeting ground for Great Britain and the Six to discuss their differences on more or less equal footing. The second reason and one which if genuinely accepted by the member states would have provided WEU with a truly more meaningful existence was that WEU's true area of competence now lay in the non-technical (political) area.

In the course of his report, Mr. Conte pointed out to the Assembly that on the technical level the role of WEU had lost much of its substance. He referred specifically to the reduction or loss of WEU influence in the Saar, where the WEU mandate had come to an end in 1959; in the cultural and social areas, because many of these activities had been transferred to the Council of Europe; and in the military area, because most of the initial WEU machinery in the military sphere had been transferred to NATO to avoid duplication. While granting that WEU still retained influence in the last area because of the Standing Armaments Committee and the Armaments Agency, Mr. Conte summed up the position of WEU as follows:

> . . . the main interest of Western European Union is much more in its non-technical role. This interest lies in the now accepted practice of meeting to endeavour to define a joint line of action for the WEU

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> . . . the main interest of Western European Union is much more in its neo-technical role. This interest lies in the new assigned potential of working to endeavour to define a joint line of action for the WEU

> countries on items on the agenda of other international organizations. It also stems from the general discussions which have been held in this Assembly and finally from the fact that the Union is an excellent meeting place for the United Kingdom and the six member States of the integrated communities.[22]

A section of particular importance, both to the question of WEU's future role and the main issue of Great Britain and the Six, was what Mr. Conte called "critical period in the growth of Europe." In this section, he carefully established the dilemma of Great Britain's hesitancy toward Europe and Europe's extreme impatience with Great Britain. After having skillfully laid the basis for his case, he then asked the rhetorical question--what could be done to reconcile these extreme positions. The answer, which had been readily apparent throughout Mr. Conte's presentation, was British accession to the Communities. However, as a matter of tactical consideration, the General Affairs Committee recommended only that Great Britain join Euratom as a full member. The logic behind this partial approach lay in the fact that Euratom would be the easiest to join in a practical sense, yet it would be an important base upon which to build.

The reaction of the Assembly to the Committee's report and recommendations during the debating period was

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[22] Ibid., p. 112.

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[72] Ibid., p. 112.

highly favorable, and the recommendation concerning Great Britain's accession to Euratom was passed by unanimous vote.[23]

The British government's immediate reaction, as presented by Mr. Profumo during the debate period, was necessarily cautious but hopeful. Certainly, this was the very sort of encouragement Great Britain was looking for on the Continent, but Mr. Profumo's remarks had to be measured because the British government was still in the process of deciding what its next move would be.

Although the partial approach seemed like a logical beginning to the gentlemen of the General Affairs Committee and the Assembly, their view was not shared by the leaders of the Community Organization. The position of the Community's authorities was that the three Communities formed one unit and partial membership was not possible.[24]

Accepting the defeat of the partial approach in its stride, the General Affairs Committee renewed its efforts toward finding an acceptable solution by shifting their thinking toward a more comprehensive solution.

In the autumn of 1960, the WEU Conservative Members of Parliament began discussing with the British Foreign

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[23] Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 135-138.

[24] Camps, op. cit., p. 292.

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[23] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 135-136.

[24] Campe, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

Office the merits of a bold plan to introduce a recommendation in the Assembly recommending Great Britain's entry into the Common Market. Shortly thereafter, it was arranged for the General Affairs Committee to consider this proposal which it did.[25]

The results of the General Affairs Committee's consideration of this proposal came in its report to the Assembly on November 17, 1960. The heart of the report was contained in the following recommendation:

> That taking into account the United Kingdom's obligations to her partners in EFTA and the Commonwealth, negotiations be opened between the member Governments of Western European Union with a view to expediting an arrangement between the European Economic Community and the United Kingdom, which will result in the United Kingdom acceding to the European Economic Community as a full member.[26]

While the introduction of this recommendation would seem to have been a futile maneuver on the part of the Committee, considering the reaction to their recommendation concerning Great Britain's accession to Euratom, their reason for presenting it was logical. The primary reason the recommendation for Great Britain's accession to Euratom was "pigeonholed" by the Six was that it could not be considered until Great Britain had made a decision about the EEC. This recommendation obviously initiated by the

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[25]Beloff, op. cit., p. 103.

[26]Document 84, Proceedings, Sixth Session, December, 1960, Vol. I, p. 102.

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[25] Report, op. cit., p. 102.

[26] Document 84, Proceedings, Sixth Session, December,
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British M. P.'s would serve the dual purpose of forecasting the probable British government's impending decision to the Six, while it would also tend to temper British public opinion concerning such a policy reversal on the part of their government.

After lengthy debate on the recommendation during which everyone reminded everyone else about the difficulties involved concerning Great Britain's joining the EEC, the recommendation was carried fifty-eight to four with one abstention, and was then forwarded to the Council for consideration.[27] During the Council's review of the recommendation, Mr. Heath, speaking for the British government, clarified Great Britain's position as follows:

1. Great Britain still considered the business of the Communities the sole concern of the Six, and Great Britain could not expect to participate in it until they had either joined or formed some association with the Communities.

2. Great Britain was not seriously considering attempting to enter the Communities' economic structure without also incurring the accompanying political obligations.

3. Until such time as the entrance of Great Britain into the Communities was resolved, Great Britain still wished to share in the political discussions of "broad European" and "world wide" problems with the Six. Again, Great Britain suggested the use of WEU as the body where such discussions could take place.[28]

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[27] Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 19.

[28] Camps, op. cit., p. 333.

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> 3. Until such time as the entrance of Great Britain into the Communities was received, Great Britain still wished to share in the political discussions of "broad European" and "world wide" problems with the Six. Again, Great Britain suggested the use of WEU as the body where such discussions could take place.[58]

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[57] Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 13.

[58] Camps, op. cit., p. 193.

With regard to the actual WEU proposal that Great Britain should accede to the EEC, Mr. Heath stated that the British government did not wish to express a view on the recommendation. He again stated that Great Britain was certainly not afraid of such a move on their part and that, if and when they did join, it must be on a political as well as economic basis.[29] Here again it is obvious that until Great Britain's government had definitely decided what action it was going to pursue, the WEU had no direct influence on the situation. Certainly, their recommendation had an indirect influence because it did oblige the member governments to discuss the question openly in the Council.

On July 31, 1961, Mr. Macmillan made the historic announcement of the British government's decision to apply for membership in the EEC. The action certainly appeared to justify the efforts of the members of the Assembly to bring it about. From that moment until General de Gaulle's fatal pronouncement in January, 1963, the Assembly continued to bring as much pressure to bear as it could to speed up the entrance of Great Britain into the EEC. In December, 1961, the Assembly passed, by a unanimous vote, Recommendation 71, which urged the member governments to

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[29] Ibid.

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With respect to the second MEC proposal that Great Britain should accede to the EEC, Mr. Heath stated that the British government did not wish to embrace a view on the recommendation. He again stated that Great Britain was certainly not afraid of such a move on their part and that, if and when they did join, it would be politically as well as economic basis.[20] There again is obvious that until Great Britain's government has definitely decided what action it was going to pursue, the EEC has no direct influence on the situation. Certainly their recommendation had an indirect influence because it did oblige the member governments to discuss the question openly in the Council.

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[20]Ibid.

"spare no effort whatsoever to insure the success of the negotiations."[30] In the course of the general debate on the subject in December, 1961, the role of WEU in the negotiations was emphasized by the British representative Mr. Kirk, when he stated:

> . . . I wish to underline the role which will fall to WEU and the Assembly in the months ahead. In a certain sense we have to be the watchdogs in this matter, ready to spur on the governments if they show signs of faltering and to help in these very difficulties can be got around or over and in general keeping an eye on them . . . .[31]

By the June, 1962, meeting of the Assembly, the negotiations between Great Britain and the Six had been in progress for over seven months and yet seems to have made no real progress toward a successful ending. The Assembly again attempted to bring its influence to bear on the subject during that session by passing Recommendation 75, which expressed concern over the course of the negotiations and suggested ways of insuring their speedy completion.[32] The feelings of the Assembly were so strong about the negotiations that it decided to communicate this recommendation directly to the member governments rather than going through

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[30] Proceedings, Seventh Session, December 19, 1961, Vol. IV, p. 36.

[31] Ibid., p. 146.

[32] Proceedings, Eight Session, June, 1962, Vol., I, pp. 181-182.

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[30] Proceedings, Seventh Session, December 17, 1953, Vol. IV, p. 36.

[31] Ibid., p. 144.

[32] Proceedings, Eight Session, June, 1954, Vol., I, pp. 181-182.

the Council. During the general debate, Mr. Heath, speaking as Chairman of the Council, reassured the Assembly that he was optimistic about the negotiations, and he reaffirmed Great Britain's willingness to continue on her present course.

During the December, 1962, meeting of the Assembly, there appeared to be a certain air of confidence in the Assembly about the negotiations. This was certainly evidenced by a report to the Assembly by the General Affairs Committee which dealt with the "consequences of the accession of the United Kingdom for the functioning of the institutions of the European Communities."[33]

The recommendations of the Committee, based on their report, dealt with mechanical details pertaining to the proper functioning of the Community institutions after the accession of Great Britain to the Rome Treaties, apparently indicating that the negotiations were approaching a successful close (at least, in the view of the Committee). Yet the optimism shown by the Committee, the Assembly in general, and many other most interested parties was soon to be shattered.

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[33] Ibid., December, 1962, Vol. III, Document 248.

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[13] Ibid., December, 1962, Vol. III, Document 169.

passed on the entire subject of Great Britain's entry into the Common Market. Some fifteen days later, in Brussels, the negotiations officially came to an end following the French Foreign Minister's presentation of France's official position.[34] A detailed explanation of why the French government acted as it did is a matter beyond the scope of this investigation, yet the very act itself certainly had a definite effect on WEU. It forecast a significant decline in the prospects for successful completion of the Assembly's first major political battle. In many respects, the Assembly had placed all its resources behind the British application, and Great Britain's rejection was a critical tactical defeat for the Assembly. However, the Assembly certainly did not give up the fight following the "veto."

On February 25, 1963, the Presidential Committee of the Assembly, acting on behalf of the Assembly, forwarded a recommendation to the Council that they meet as soon as possible to consider the situation the veto had left WEU and Europe faced with.[35] At the next regular meeting of the Assembly in June, 1963, the dilemma presented by the halt in the negotiations was the main subject of debate.

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[34]Beloff, op. cit., p. 11.

[35]Proceedings, Ninth Session, June, 1963, Vol. II, p. 41.

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[35] Proceedings, Ninth Session, June, 1963, Vol. IX, p. 41.

[34] Bator, op. cit., p. 112.

The general attitude of the Assembly was one of seeking some method of bringing about the resumption of negotiations. The starting point for the discussions was a series of draft recommendations accompanied by an explanatory report presented by the General Affairs Committee.[36] The Committee suggested the following bases for a course of action to be recommended by WEU:

1. Re-establishment of an atmosphere of confidence.
2. The need for the EEC to continue.
3. The United Kingdom must remain a candidate for accession even if the resumption of negotiations in the immediate future proves impossible.
4. Conflict between the two economic blocs (EEC and EFTA).
5. The need to move from economic union to political authority.

After long and arduous debate, these basic courses of action became the substance of the Assembly's Recommendation 95 to the Council of Ministers. The reply to the recommendation by the Council informed the Assembly that the Seven Member governments had agreed to hold quarterly ministerial meetings of WEU devoted to an exchange of views on the main political and economic problems of interest.[37]

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[36] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 115.

[37] Ibid., December, 1963, Vol. III, p. 114.

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The general activity of the Assembly was one of seeking some method of reducing about the resumption of hostilities. The meeting paved for the discussions was a period of great preoccupations accompanied by an explanatory report presented by the General Affairs Committee.[36] The Committee suggested the following bases for a course of action to be recommended by WEU:

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[36] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 113.

[37] Ibid. December, 1961, Vol. III, p. 114.

Considering the sensitivity with which the member governments (particularly Great Britain and France) viewed the entire subject it was obvious that the commitment to quarterly meetings was as far as they would go.

Gradually, in the year following the veto, it became apparent that the member governments wished to impose a moratorium on the question of the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities until they could make a basic re-evaluation of the situation and could decide future courses of action. With such a moratorium in effect, the Assembly of WEU had lost its measure of influence on the subject, for the time being. However, time has a way of healing dilemmas such as the one presented by the rejection of Great Britain's application to the EEC. The initial indignation created by Great Britain's rebuff has subsided to a considerable degree. It is evident, particularly in the last year, that the Labor Government in Great Britain still considers membership in the EEC to be in the national interest of Great Britain, and it is constantly exploring the possibilities of locating the mutual ground upon which her admission will become a reality. Conditions have changed since the negotiation period of 1961-1962, a major change for example is the unclear future for NATO, and with these changes, the eventual admission of Great Britain to the Communities seems much more promising.

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What Great Britain's entrance into the Communities would have meant in 1963, and may still mean in 1970, for WEU in the realm of increased importance is at best an educated guess. Looking at the earlier possibility first, which, in the light of subsequent events, appears to have been less promising for WEU, the tangible gains for the WEU seemed to lay only in the area of a strengthened political reputation. Realistically speaking, WEU was merely the convenient meeting place in which the opposing sides could conduct their public discussions. The chances for a significantly strengthened role for WEU, as a defense or a political organization appeared slight. The success or failure of the whole operation in itself appears to have offered little harm or good to the status of WEU as an organization, unless, of course, the member states found it in their interest to attach WEU to the "Community Organizations" in the event of a successful period of negotiation.

However, in the light of the changes in relationships among the various Western European states and the crisis which has arisen over the future function and shape of the Atlantic Alliance which has occurred since 1963, the prospects for WEU's future seem considerably brighter should Great Britain finally make her way into the continental organizations. In view of the apparent bi-polarization which seems to be taking place within the NATO Alliance,

the WEU is the logical organization to represent the Western European states in defense matters. When Great Britain joins Europe, WEU stands ready to become the fourth Community organization of a "Seven power" Europe. Granted, structural changes would be in order, the most logical of which appears to be the merging of the WEU Assembly with the European Assembly and strengthening of the resultant body. But even though the WEU's identity would be merged with the other organizations, the result would be a major achievement as far as the goals of the WEU are concerned. The Assembly has worked long and hard, within the limits it was allowed to operate, to bring Great Britain into Europe; and when this finally occurs, no matter what the final status of WEU is, their contributions to the progressive integration of Europe will be among the most important.

Since the late 1940's, eight major regional organizations of European and Atlantic membership have been established to facilitate and promote the common interest of the member states. While each of the organizations seemingly was founded with one primary goal and area of competence in mind, the tendency has been for each organization to attempt to expand its area of activity as it sought solutions to various problems appearing on the European/Atlantic scene. The logical result of this situation has been a great deal of overlap and/or duplication of effort

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in their various fields of endeavor. As should be evident from the material already presented, the main problems facing the WEU have stemmed from this condition of European organization. Since the mid-1950's, there has been a steady stream of proposals to rationalize or simplify this condition of complexity on the inter-governmental plane in Europe.[38] That rationalization or simplification of the organizational structure of Western Europe is in order is beyond question, and it is within the parameters of this problem that WEU has been both interested and active. Certainly, there has been an element of self-preservation behind some of the interest displayed by WEU in the various rationalization plans; however, as is evident from the debates held by the Assembly, the main concern has been to find the solution which will best serve the interests of the member states in the context of the goals the various organizations were created to work toward. The common approach contained in all the major proposals to simplify the organizational framework of Western Europe has been some manner of reduction/combination of the various parliamentary bodies of the organizations. Because of this, the

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[38]For a detailed analytical treatment, Dr. J. Allen Hovey, Jr., The Superparliaments (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

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general topic heading for this subject became the "rationalization of European Assemblies."

Since it was created in 1956, the General Affairs Committee of the WEU Assembly has continually addressed itself to the various rationalization proposals. A central objective of the Assembly during the early years of its life was the attempt to find its political role in the general European scheme, as was discussed earlier. It was then logical for the Assembly to give particularly close scrutiny to the rationalization proposals insofar as they had a direct bearing on that search. The first major proposal in the life of the Assembly was the Grand Design plan offered by the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.[39] The plan essentially outlined the establishment of an Atlantic parliament which would replace all the existing parliamentary organizations and establish a series of commissions composed of selected delegates to handle the work formerly reserved to the Assemblies dissolved. The general consensus of the Assemblies of the organizations concerned was that the plan offered a retreat rather than an advancement in terms of the gains already made by the respective Assemblies in being recognized by the member governments.[40]

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[40] Ibid., p. 115.

Very shortly after the demise of the "Grand Design" scheme, the General Affairs Committee did adopt the same line of reasoning concerning rationalization with respect to another situation which was developing. There was a general concern that the framers of the two new Community organizations (EEC and Euratom) might possible decide to establish a fourth European Assembly to provide parliamentary supervision for the new organizations. In a report to the Assembly, Mr. Struye, Rapporteur, asked that the negotiators strongly examine the possibility of extending the competence of the Common Assembly of the ECSC to include the EEC and Euratom.[41] Among his objections to the creation of a fourth Assembly, Mr. Struye mentioned that:

> . . . effective parliamentary supervision should principally apply to the general policy of the authority concerned, the ultimate aim being the creation of a single European parliamentary body;
>
> The creation of a fourth Assembly would emphasize fragmentation not unity, increase the cost, and cause the most grave civil service problems.

As a result of the logic inherent in the Struye Recommendation, it became the basis for a concerted approach by the Bureaus of the three existing Assemblies (WEU Assembly, Common Assembly, and the Consultative Assembly of the

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[41]Document 34, Proceedings, December, 1952, p. 47.

Council of Europe) to the negotiators of the new treaties.[42] Because the fourth Assembly never came into being, at least some credit must be reflected on the General Affairs Committee for its initiative in the matter.

The general tone of the view held by the General Affairs Committee, and adopted by the Assembly, toward the various proposals concerning "rationalization of Assemblies" was clearly evident in the Committee's report entitled "The Unification of European Assemblies" of October, 1957.[43] In his comments, the Rapporteur, Mr. von der Goes von Naters, expressed the opinion that content of the proposals on the subject showed a clear lack of contact between the member governments and the members of Parliament who had direct experience in the institutions concerned. He went on to say that any plan for rationalization similar to those already offered was premature. The general objection offered by the Rapporteur in 1957, and one which would be applied to the subsequent proposals offered on this matter, was that they all contained one major deficiency in that they would be a step backward in terms of the status won by the existing Assemblies. The Assembly concurred with the General Affairs Committee's recommendation to ensure:

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> . . . that the European Assembly does not remain under the tutelage of the consultative status granted in 1949 [Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe], but has responsibilities and powers in no circumstances less than those established in 1955 by the Charter of the Assembly of Western European Union.[44]

It is quite evident from the Assembly's actions that they would not then, nor in the future, endorse a proposal for simplifying the plan of inter-governmental organization in Europe if it meant a loss of the competence already gained by the various organizations. And it is not unusual that the WEU Assembly should feel more strongly about the subject than any of the other bodies because the Assembly technically possessed more competence in the parliamentary field. Even considering the fact that the Assembly possessed only consultative status, the Charter which it granted itself contained a number of features which gave it more independence than either the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe or the Common Assembly of the Communities. Among the most important of these features are:

1. Its ability to transmit a "motion to disagree to the Council concerning the content of the Council's Annual Report.

2. The prerogatives of WEU Committees to forward questions to the Council via the President of the Assembly and the provision that unanswered questions will be published to that effect.

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3. The ability of the President of the Assembly to convene extraordinary sessions of the Assembly.[45]

Although these features in practice did not add to the Assembly's real political power, they were a definite advancement toward establishing parliamentary supervision in inter-governmental organizations.

Although the Assembly had definitely established its basic suspicion concerning the plans for rationalization, it, by no means, abandoned the subject. In fact, the subject of "rationalization of Assemblies" and inspection of the subsequent proposals in this direction remained a primary area of work for the General Affairs Committee. In a comprehensive report on the subject, in July, 1958, Mr. Struye, Rapporteur for the Committee, reviewed both the functional and institutional approaches offered for rationalization, pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of both.[46] After a lengthy critical review of the material concerned, Mr. Struye then went on to its most important section, which was the transmission of a suggestion made by Furfer, President of the Common Assembly of the ECSC. Basically, Mr. Furfer's suggestion was a very elementary

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[45] See supra, pp. 40-41.

[46] Document 81, Proceedings, June, 1928, p. 142.

plan for increased cooperation among the existing Assemblies containing the following points:

1. Instead of existing arrangements have a joint annual meeting of the three Assemblies.

2. Have the Bureaus of the Assemblies draw up rules and an agenda.

The Assembly indicated its approval for the low key approach to greater cooperation in its Resolution 9 of July, 1958, in which the Bureau of WEU was instructed:

> To contact the Bureaux of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the European Parliamentary Assembly for the following purposes
>
> 1. To convene at a fixed date an annual joint meeting of the three European Assemblies . . . .
>
> 2. To set up a Standing Group of the three Bureaux . . . .[47]

Despite the Assembly's enthusiasm for this approach, its views were not generally shared, and the recommendation brought little in the way of tangible results.

After 1958, the Assembly and the General Affairs Committee, in particular, continued to give close attention to the new proposals for rationalization; however, little has been accomplished in the way of gaining any consensus for the various plans. The Atlantic and the European political scenes have witnessed a number of problems concerning

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[47]Resolution 9, Proceedings, July, 1958, Vol. II, p. 34.

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[47] Resolution 9, Proceedings, July, 1958, Vol. II, p. 34.

relationships and goals which have tended to overshadow the business of simplifying the organizational structure of Europe. Some of the major factors were Great Britain's attempt to join Europe and its temporary failure, and the policies pursued by the French government in many key political issues. All these factors are directly interrelated, and it is quite obvious that, until a large measure of agreement is reached among the major states of Europe concerning their own and Europe's future, little progress will be made.

A common feature among the many plans offered for rationalizing both European and Atlantic inter-governmental cooperation is the establishment of a consultative assembly for the Atlantic area and the evolution through continuation of one European Assembly to speak for Europe within the Western Alliance. A feature common to almost every plan for rationalizing the European Assemblies includes either the disestablishment or severe limiting of the Assembly of the WEU primarily through the transfer of its functions to existing assemblies or a new more comprehensive one. As will be discussed in the next chapter, this eventuality seems both logical and certain once the present obstacles to increased European cooperation are surmounted. When that point is reached, the WEU Assembly will have reached the end of its useful life; but it will leave

behind a number of important legacies in the field of inter-governmental parliamentary supervision.

The Assembly has been the only parliamentary body of its type to be empowered to debate the broad questions of European and Western defense. It has experienced a number of frustrations in attempting to fulfill what it considered its role to be; however, these frustrations and the compromises reached because of them between the Assembly and the Council can serve as guideposts to its successor in this field. According to Dr. Hovey:

> The Assembly's main claim to success lies not in the area of substantive resolutions implemented, although there were instances of such, but of strengthening parliamentary and public understanding and support of Western defense effort.[48]

In addition to its primary contribution of exposing the questions of Western defense to public debate, the Assembly has made certain definite contributions to inter-governmental parliamentary supervision. Through oversight primarily, the Assembly was created with few rules to guide it; because of this situation, the parliamentarians were forced to establish the rules (the Charter) under which it would operate. With this freedom, the Assembly gave itself powers, such as the "motion to disagree" among others, which attempted to make the member governments responsible (to a limited

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[48]Hovey, op. cit., p. 79.

behind a number of important legacies in the field of inter-governmental parliamentary cooperation.

The Assembly has been the only parliamentary body of its type to be empowered to debate the broad questions of European and Western defense. It has experienced a number of frustrations in attempting to fulfill what it considered its role to be; however, these frustrations and the compromises reached because of them between the Assembly and the Council can serve as guideposts to its successor in this field. According to Dr. Hovey:

> The Assembly's main claim to success lies not in the area of substantive resolutions implemented, although there were instances of such, but of strengthening parliamentary and public understanding and support of Western defense effort.[48]

In addition to its primary contribution of expanding the question of Western defense to public debate, the Assembly has made certain definite contributions to inter-governmental parliamentary cooperation. Through overlight primarily, the Assembly was created with few rules to guide it; because of this situation, the parliamentarians were forced to establish the rules (the Charter) under which it would operate. With this freedom, the Assembly gave itself powers, such as the "motion to dissolve" among others, which attempted to make the member governments responsible (to a limited

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[48]Hovey, op. cit., p. 70.

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CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE ROLE OF WEU IN WESTERN EUROPE

The future of WEU is at best uncertain, considering that it is an actor of secondary importance in the complex political arena in which the major nations of the Western Alliance operate. Because it is a purely inter-governmental organization, dependent completely on the decisions of its seven member governments, WEU cannot, in and of itself, do much to alter its own destiny outside the limits of the consultative status which has been conferred upon it. Its contributions toward enhancing the collective future of its member states, as described earlier, have been significant in many respects, but they are by no means monumental. WEU has played a secondary role in the affairs of Western Europe, except for momentary lapses into the limelight when it served the interest of its members. Yet, in view of a number of factors and developments in the 1960's, there is a very strong possibility that WEU does have an important role to play in the future. This future role is dependent upon two major changes in the present set of relationships in the Western Alliance. The first change will be the admission of Great Britain to the Communities sometime in the next one to three years. And the second change, which is directly related to, although not entirely dependent on,

CHAPTER X

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the first is the gradual establishment of the dumb-bell (U.S.-Western Europe) relationship in the Western Alliance.

That Great Britain will join the Communities in the near future is a prediction which is dependent on a number of variables; however, there seems to be every indication that it will happen. The British government made the decision to join in 1961, and it has never repudiated that choice because it is in the long-range national interest of Great Britain to join Europe. The tactics of General de Gaulle certainly hurt British pride and momentarily clouded over the real British need to become a part of Europe, but the wounds caused by France are gradually healing. This is evidenced by Prime Minister Wilson's recent speaking tour on the Continent to explore the obstacles which have to be removed before Great Britain can join.[1] Through his speeches and actions, the British Prime Minister has pledged himself to go to any reasonable lengths to get Great Britain in the Common Market. When Great Britain does join, the prospects for WEU's future will be enhanced considerably. By joining the "Continent," Great Britain cannot help but reduce the special relationship she has enjoyed with the United States. She will be playing a different role in that her outlook will necessarily become

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[1] *Time*, January 27, 1967, pp. 26-27.

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[1] Time, January 17, 1967, pp. 23-27.

"Europeanized," which will undoubtedly have a direct influence on the existing set of relationships in the NATO Alliance. It is within the context of a revision of the relationships within NATO that a new role for WEU is envisioned.

Since the late 1950's, the NATO Alliance has been troubled by a number of problems which have weakened the apparent solidarity the organization possessed in the early 1950's. The mid-1960's finds NATO in a period of crisis with respect to the organization's future. This period of crisis is most conveniently blamed on the narrow nationalistic aspirations of France's President; yet granting that the General has not made solutions any easier to find, the roots of the problem go beyond just France's actions. The basic problem is that the dynamically resurgent Europe of the 1960's is not content with the superior-inferior relationship vis-à-vis the United States that she was content with in the early years of the Alliance. This dissatisfaction, on the part of the Western European nations and the tremors it has sent through NATO, must eventually lead to the establishment of a new set of relationships within the Alliance. What must necessarily result is some modified version of the "dumb-bell" concept within the Alliance, meaning essentially that the United States would grant a measure of equality to the "Seven Power Europe" in the

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Alliance decision making. When this occurs, the WEU, as the military organization of the Seven, will be the logical organization to supervise the military contributions of the Seven to NATO. The form of the existing WEU organization will, no doubt, be changed if it becomes, in essence, the fourth Community Organization, but the organization itself is ready and able to assume that function.

One extremely important function the WEU might acquire by such a reordering of the European scene, as described above, is to become the repository for a European nuclear deterrent. Although the nuclear dilemma within the Alliance has been an outward manifestation of the deeper problems described earlier, the solution of the nuclear problem would certainly be one major objective of a revised set of relationships within NATO.

A detailed discussion of the "nuclear dilemma" existing within the Atlantic Alliance is beyond the scope of this research; yet because one of the many proposed solutions for this problem involves WEU directly, it is necessary to discuss the suitability of WEU for such a role as well as speculating on the probability of this particular solution being chosen.

The basic issue involved in NATO's "nuclear dilemma" is the fact that some of America's Western European allies want a genuine voice in the political control of the nuclear

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The basic issue involved in NATO's "nuclear dilemma" is the fact that some of America's Western European allies want a decisive voice in the political control of the nuclear

deterrent guarding Western Europe against the threat posed by Soviet Russia. In 1949, the United States committed its military power to the defense of Western Europe when it signed the NATO Treaty. At that time, as the prime component of its commitment, the United States guaranteed the physical security of the area by its nuclear capability.[2] It was logical then that the Europeans willfully accepted the fact that the ultimate means of their own survival was controlled independently by the United States. The menacing stance of the Soviet Union coupled with their own inability to guarantee their own survival could have led to no other logical conclusion. However, the conditions which contributed to the willing acceptance of American unilateral control in the 1940's have changed considerably in the past fifteen years. The economically-prostrate Europe of 1949 has reawakened in a burst of dynamic economic development to challenge seriously its former relationship with the United States. With this economic transformation has come the desire, on the part of some of America's NATO partners, to share in the control of the weapons which guard their ultimate survival.

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[2]Harold L. Nieburg, Nuclear Secrecy and Foreign Policy (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964), p. 164.

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the Alliance to one of nuclear sharing with bilateral controls in the 1960's in partial answer to pressure from Europe.[3] But the existing bilateral controls continue to impose an effective American veto over the use of the weapons. American policy has remained one of alliance-with-denial and sharing-with-secrecy for the expressed reason of preventing the proliferation of nuclear capabilities, yet the policy has not prevented other nations from acquiring a nuclear capability. For years, the United States has pledged to consult with our NATO partners, time permitting, prior to using nuclear weapons. However, this offer has not been received with unanimous satisfaction by our allies in Europe. Certainly, the most outstanding critic of American policy in this area has been General de Gaulle as evidenced by his actions in NATO and in completing an independent French nuclear capability.

The nuclear-sharing issue is even further complicated by the fact that Great Britain, because of her independent achievement of a nuclear capability, has been privileged to enjoy a closer "sharing" relationship with the United States than any of the rest of the NATO countries--much to the disgust of France.[4] While employing its nuclear capability to

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protect itself and Europe from the Soviet Union, the United States has come to acknowledge a mutual interest with the Soviet Union. That interest, being to preserve and maintain the bipolar configuration of nuclear capability, because of mutual agreement that proliferation of nuclear weapons is inherently dangerous.[5]

The proposed United States solution to the problem of granting its European allies a greater voice in the management and operation of NATO's nuclear defense in the early 1960's was various versions of the highly controversial Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). While the proposed American program included European participation in the handling and operation of the weapons, it still retained an effective American veto over the use of the weapons--the very issue the Europeans have contested. Consequently, the MLF program was not able to provide an answer to the problem.

The search for a mutually-acceptable solution to the nuclear dilemma has generated an enormous amount of research and theorizing as to ways to solve the problem by a wealth of experts on both sides of the Atlantic. The subject has been dealt with in numerous books and dozens of probing articles, as well as being a topic for serious discussion

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in many governments and parliamentary bodies, including the Assembly of the WEU.

In the area of speculation as to alternative solutions to the present "dilemma," the various authorities on the subject have, for the most part, agreed on the existence of five general plans. These include:

1. Strategic divorce--a non Atlantic pattern of political organization for the West. Europe looking to its own defenses strategic as well as tactical, creating its own national deterrents where possible.

2. Status quo--a continuation of the dominant United States monopoly of nuclear warheads within NATO accompanied by a continuation of bilateral agreements between the United States and Allies with a nuclear capability.

3. A non-nuclear NATO--a denuclearization of the NATO Alliance shifting to a complete conventional stance within the Alliance while relying competely on the United States to provide strategic deterrence from across the Atlantic.

4. A NATO deterrent--a force somewhat similar to the MLF force suggested by the United States in which the United States forces would remain under national control, but ways would be sought to widen the area of European participation in command and control of such weapons.

5. An independent European contribution to the existing Western deterrent--a force entirely under the political control of Europeans, but comprising an integral part of the total Western deterrent.[6]

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[6]Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 215-217.

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It is in the area of this last broad alternative (No. 5) that, as suggested by many authorities on the subject, WEU may find a new sense of purpose and being. While each of the suggested alternatives have advantages and disadvantages inherent in their solutions, they will be mentioned only to the extent that they are relevant to alternative five. The suitability of WEU for such a role, as suggested in alternative five, and the probability of WEU receiving such a function are the primary areas of concern so that no direct attempt will be made to prove or disprove the worth of the various other solutions.

The prospect of an independent European contribution to the American-controlled Western deterrent is certainly a promising and, in some ways, an attractive solution to the present nuclear dilemma. Any such solution would have to have American concurrence to render it feasible; yet, while this concurrence was out of the question before, the situation has changed and will continue to change. When Great Britain joins the Communities, the United States will have to contend with an even more uniform European viewpoint. In the area of defense, Great Britain's nuclear capability will, to a large degree, "belong" to Europe, thus making the negotiating position of the United States in NATO even more difficult on the subject of nuclear weapons. It is quite possible also that the French position of retaining

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national control of nuclear weapons might gradually evolve toward accepting the idea of a European deterrent in view of the new set of European relationships which would result from Great Britain's association with the Continent. In this respect, the United States would be in a good position to require that the donation of the French nuclear capability to a European deterrent as its price for supporting the raising of a European deterrent. If the United States approved of the idea politically, it is certain that she would agree to help in its construction (financially and technologically), thus providing a tangible factor to induce French agreement or, at least, to induce the other nations of the "Seven" to exert pressure on France. In view of past and contemporary American positions on the subject of non-American nuclear capabilities, it is clear that the United States would like to continue to avoid the sanctioning of a European deterrent, yet indications are that she will slowly be forced into it. Unless the American commitment to continued strengthening of the Western Alliance changes, it seems very probable that a European contribution to the Western deterrent is the price she will have to accept.

Accepting that American concurrence is a necessary prerequisite, there are a number of other major factors to consider. First, as suggested above, the existing nuclear

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Applying that American concurrence is a necessary prerequisite, there are a number of other major factors to consider. First, as suggested above, the existing nuclear

powers in Europe must be in agreement that such a common deterrent, to which their own capabilities would be donated, would be in their own as well as the European common interest. This could be the major fault in the whole case for a European deterrent in view of the past actions of France, yet there is the distinct possibility that France will adopt the more European view if she is convinced that American influence has really declined in European affairs. A second major consideration concerning a European deterrent is that of political control for such a capability. What organization or institutional framework would be best suited for both making the broad political decisions about the nature and use of the force and for building, maintaining, and modernizing it.

WEU, as the military "arm" of a "Seven Power Europe" is obviously the logical organization to assume at least most of, if not all of, the responsibilities concerning a European deterrent. Aside from new treaty amendments to provide guidelines for the deterrent and the raising of WEU's staff to the numbers needed to carry out such responsibilities, the existing organization seems quite capable of carrying out the task. The Council would provide the necessary source of political direction required while the Assembly would continue to fulfill its role of providing the parliamentary scrutiny for such an undertaking. Although

power in Europe must be in agreement that such a common deterrent, to which their own capabilities would be donated, would be in their own as well as the European common interest. This could be the major fault in the whole case for a European deterrent in view of the past actions of France, yet there is the distinct possibility that France will adopt the more European view if she is convinced that American influence has really declined in European affairs. A second major consideration concerning a European deterrent is that of political control for such a capability. What organisation or institutional framework would be best suited for both making the agreed political decisions about the nature and use of the force and for building, maintaining, and modernising it.

NATO, as the military "arm" of a "Seven Power Europe" is obviously the logical organisation to assume at least some of, if not all of, the responsibilities concerning a European deterrent. Aside from new treaty amendments to provide guidelines for the deterrent and the relation of NATO's staff to the members needed to carry out such responsibilities, the existing organisation seems quite capable of carrying out the task. The Council would provide the necessary source of political direction required while the Assembly would continue to fulfil its role of providing the parliamentary scrutiny for such an undertaking. Although

the WEU could assume the initial task with a minimum of change, it is quite evident that a number of weaknesses would be inherent in this situation with respect to elements of "control" the WEU could exert over the member states. If the main weakness of the present organization--its purely consultative status--is perpetuated in the treaty amendments, the credibility of the deterrent's effectiveness will be significantly reduced. This then leads to the logical conclusion that some elements of supranational control would have to be invested in the organization. This would, indeed, be a major decision for the Seven to entertain; yet, even considering that it broaches the question of the desirability of integration in the defense field, it would be the logical extension of integration in the economic sector. If both logic, necessity, and political consensus lead to such a historic decision by the Seven and an elementary amount of supranationalism is introduced in the defense sector, this will require a re-examination of the organizational structure of Seven Power Europe. This may well take place even outside the question of a deterrent when the WEU becomes, in essence, the fourth organization of the Seven, but the same general changes would result.

The major change which would result would be the merging of the role of the WEU Assembly with that of the European Parliament. In addition, it seems very probable

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that an executive body to control the activities of the organization would be required. The exact composition of the executive body--percentage of civilians and military--is a consideration the details of which could be worked out later.

The introduction of supranational control in the military sector through WEU would certainly be the second major step in Western Europe's search for her identity in the future. The WEU's organizational structure would necessarily be altered although its true role in the European scene would, at last, have been found and, at the same time, it would have made a significant advancement toward one of its goals--the progressive integration of Europe.

Although this argument in support of WEU becoming the possessor of a European deterrent and in reality becoming the European defense organization is supported by logic and speculation based upon recent events in Europe, the description of obstacles in the path of such an eventuality has been brief and in the case of the German question omitted. This is not to suggest that the obstacles are ones which will be easily surmounted for quite the opposite is true. Yet, if the determination of the Western European nations to find the best form of association possible continues, these obstacles can be overcome in time, and the solution presented will become more feasible with the passage of that time.

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The first published argument in favor of WEU becoming Europe's nuclear armed defense organization came in 1958 in Ben T. Moore's book, NATO and the Future of Europe.[7] In his argument, Mr. Moore suggested that because the members of Euratom "have the capability to develop in time an integrated strategic deterrent" and because Great Britain could add significantly to the success of such an undertaking, WEU, with its combined membership, offered an ideal solution for such an undertaking. In December, 1959, a proposal for a Joint European Strategic Nuclear Force was submitted to the WEU Assembly by Mr. F. W. Mulley, Rapporteur for the Defense Committee.[8]

Mr. Mulley, a British Labor Member of Parliament since 1950, was a British delegate to the Council of Europe and the WEU from 1958 through 1961, and was Vice President of the Assembly in 1960. He is a respected observer of and participant in debate over European political issues and has made a considerable number of suggestions toward their solutions, as is evidenced by his book, The Politics of Western Defence.

Mr. Mulley's plan was essentially to set up the political machinery within the framework of WEU to control

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[7]Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 207-8.

[8]Stanley, op. cit., p. 223.

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[7] Sen C. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), pp. 197-8.

[8] Mulley, op. cit., p. 117.

all the nuclear weapons produced in the member countries. His intention was that none of the national nuclear forces could be used without the sanction and authority of the WEU Council of Ministers. The proposal called for an end point or political usage control and did not include control restraints at the lower levels, such as joint production of weapons, sharing of secrets, or sharing of weapons. Mr. Mulley did envision that machinery might be created, upon the success of the initial plan, to make nuclear weapons research and production a joint venture; however, he did not consider these measures necessary or essential elements in the establishment of political control of the weapons.[9]

The plan was supported by a majority of the members of the Assembly, after which it was recommended to the Council where it found little support. The plan became less and less attractive to the individual member governments for a number of reasons. In France, the successful nuclear test explosions and the decision to acquire an independent nuclear capability reduced the likelihood of French support. Great Britain, during that period, had decided to abandon the "Blue Streak" program in favor of the American "Skybolt" air-to-ground missile, thus strengthening Great

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[9]F. W. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 86-87.

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[9] F. M. Molly, The Politics of Weapons Defense (New York: Praeger Publishers A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 86-87.

Britain's nuclear defense ties with the United States and, thereby, decreasing the possibility that her defense posture would take on a European orientation. With these two essential governments removed from the support column, the Mulley plan no longer seems feasible. Mr. Mulley's evaluation of the situation was that "interdependence remains a very good theme for political addresses: it still has to attain the status of practical policy."[10]

Following the veto of Great Britain's application to the Common Market, Mr. Mulley shifted his support to some sort of European deterrent within the NATO framework. His main reason for feeling that a NATO plan, instead of a WEU plan, was more feasible was the policy shift on the part of the United States in that it has begun to strongly push the MLF-NATO Nuclear Force--in answer to the dilemma and the actions of General de Gaulle in his unwillingness to share control of his force de frappe with Europe or to participate in a NATO nuclear plan. In view of these actions and the continued attempt of the WEU Council of Ministers to avoid any impression of creating a block within NATO, Mr. Mulley felt that any new vigorous attempt for a WEU

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deterrent would have a harmful divisive within NATO as well as having little chance of success.[11]

Some American analysts and research organizations continued to promote the idea of a European deterrent under WEU in spite of the events of 1960-1963. In addition to the favorable aspects mentioned earlier, the fact that WEU's treaty life is some fifty years and that WEU has had considerable experience in arms control are also brought up as further proof of the feasibility of the idea. Building the Atlantic World, a Foreign Policy Research Institute book, published in 1963, presents a very detailed defense of such a plan leading to the conclusion that when Western Europe possesses its own credible deterrent it will be in a position where it is able to bargain as an equal with the United States concerning the defense of the West.[12] In a more recent book by Mr. Henry Kissinger, a similar plan for an Allied Nuclear Force under the control of WEU is suggested as a meaningful solution to nuclear dilemma.[13]

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[11]F. W. Mulley, "Nuclear Weapons," Orbis (Spring, 1963), pp. 36-37.

[12]Robert Strausz-Hupe, James E. Dougherty, and William R. Kintner, Building the Atlantic World (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 220-230.

[13]Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965), p. 176.

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In view of the "expert" support cited above for WEU to become a "nuclear power" and considering the fact that conditions are even more favorable now than they were when these earlier arguments were offered, it is imperative that the merits of this solution be kept in the foreground of discussion. The acceptability of this solution is dependent on other factors--principally the admission of Great Britain to the Communities--yet it can and will be the second step toward the strengthening of Western Europe and the Western Alliance.

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The debacle caused by the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 caused significant pressures to be exerted by the United States and certain Western European nations to find an acceptable substitute for that organization. The major problem to be solved, particularly as viewed from the Western side of the Atlantic, was the legalized rearming of West Germany and her admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to bolster the defenses of that Alliance. The organization, which was quickly agreed upon as the acceptable substitute, was the Western European Union, an inter-governmental organization built on the lifeless structure of the Brussels Treaty Organization. The WEU was born of crisis to solve one main problem--the rearmament of Germany--yet the organization was given a formal structure and a number of broad functions to carry out. Under the Paris Agreements of 1954, WEU was to have a primary role in defense matters, and it was also given competence in political, economic, social, and cultural matters. Yet, once the organization was created and the machinery by which German rearmament could be controlled was established, the member states refused to make use of the WEU in pursuance of the goals they had

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established for it. The WEU was established on a purely inter-governmental basis; therefore, it contained no inherent powers by which it could enhance its own position. Even supervision of the Saar, which was envisioned as an important responsibility of the WEU, was denied to the organization when the Saar chose to join Germany. Thus, shortly after its creation, the WEU future usefulness seemed extremely limited.

The paradoxical position in which the new organization was placed, having been apparently given an important role in European organization and then having been abandoned, was caused by a combination of factors. The primary factors were the decision of the Six to return to an expanded form of economic integration and the decision by Great Britain to continue to abstain from the Six's form of supranational organization. The division between Great Britain and the Six was further aggravated by Great Britain's decision to erect a rival organization in the form of the European Free Trade Association. In view of the basic split between Great Britain and the Six, there is little doubt concerning the main source of WEU's non use; yet in spite of that disunity in membership, the WEU managed to do more than just survive. The organization has used every means at its disposal to gain the role apparently established for it by the Paris Agreements. The main

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source of life and initiative in WEU has come from the Assembly, the parliamentary organ of WEU established by one short reference in the enumerated responsibilities of the Council. The Assembly has, by no means, been brilliantly successful in its attempts to establish a useful role for WEU; yet, because of the nature of the organization, there was no real chance that the Assembly could be entirely successful without the concurrence of the member states. The WEU Assembly was established with consultative status, and it could do no more than to work toward full implementation of that status.

Despite its non use by the seven governments, the Assembly of WEU has made a number of constructive contributions to the progress of European organization. The Assembly has used its primary role as the only parliamentary body of its type empowered to debate publicly the issues of Western security and defense to bring a new awareness concerning the nature of these problems to both the European public and the parliamentarians of the member states. Because of its unique establishment, the Assembly was allowed to write its own Charter. In doing so, the Assembly granted itself a number of powers, such as the "motion to disagree," which marked a significant gain toward making the defense efforts of the member states responsive, to a degree, to inter-governmental parliamentary supervision.

The degree was limited in WEU's case to a very large degree, but the precedent is there for future organizations to learn from. WEU was granted and played a useful mediation role between Great Britain and the Six--once Great Britain had decided her destiny lay with Europe. That the initial effort failed is no reflection on the WEU, which, in a sense, staked its political future on Great Britain's admission to Europe. The Assembly is still dedicated to Great Britain's admission, and it continues to work, in the context of its own role, to achieve what it believes is the only real future for Europe. The Assembly has also contributed significantly to the debate over the rationalization of European organization by examining each proposal on the basis of its merit. When the rationalization occurs, and it will, the very experience the Assembly can offer will be of no mean value to that new organization.

Although narrowly limited by the amount of cooperation it has received from the member states, the WEU, through the activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and the Standing Armaments Committee, has made a visible contribution (though not large) to two problems Europe will have to deal with in the future. They are the problems of arms control and standardization of weapons for both financial and efficiency reasons. These two subsidiary organs of WEU have carried out their respective roles with a

high degree of dedication; and although their activities have been limited, they will still provide a useful store of experience in dealing with these problems in the future.

Since its foundation in 1955, the WEU has undergone a reduction of functional areas of responsibility. Aside from its parliamentary function and the activities of the AFCOA and the SAC, the WEU very logically turned over its remaining defense functions to the broader, more competent NATO Organization. After a lengthy period of debate, the Assembly relinquished WEU's responsibilities in social and cultural matters to the Council of Europe, thereby eliminating a major source of duplication of effort in European organization. Even though given a responsibility in the economic area, WEU never acknowledged this as a legitimate area of responsibility because of the superior abilities of other organizations in this field. This logical reorganization of tasks has led some to minimize the contributions made by WEU in European organization and to assume that it has no useful purpose either now or in the future.

The contributions made by WEU have not been spectacular; yet, considering the narrow role it has been allowed to play, the WEU, in particular the Assembly, has worked steadily to fulfill its responsibilities and has laid a constructive foundation for future parliamentary efforts in the field of European defense. For the present,

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there is no reason to assume that WEU's position or role in Europe will be significantly strengthened; however, the organization will still continue to play a useful role within its operating parameters. The future, however, holds the brightest hope for a significant strengthening of WEU's position in European organization.

The nation states of Europe are presently faced with the solution of two key political questions: whether Great Britain will be allowed to join the Communities and the final set of relationships in the Western Alliance which will be acceptable to both the United States and Europe. WEU's future as a significant organization is directly dependent on the outcome of these political issues. There are strong indications that Great Britain will be admitted to the Communities within a short period of time. When this happens, the resolution of relationships between Europe and the United States should follow in a reasonable length of time, resulting in a greater measure of independence and responsibility being granted to Europe within the Alliance. The most visible sign of this new set of relationships will be the establishment of a distinctly European contribution to the Western nuclear deterrent. If the above speculation proves to be correct, WEU will find itself charged with two important functions.

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First, as the military organization of the "Seven Power Communities," it is reasonable to assume it will be given a greater amount of cooperation by the member states and thus will be able to play a significant role in European defense policy. The logical organization to supervise and control a European deterrent is obviously the WEU--it is again reasonable to assume that it will acquire this function should the above predictions prove to be true. With these two additions in responsibility, WEU will then have a definite and important role in Europe.

Should the above predictions prove to be incorrect, or should Europe decide to agree to a perpetuation of its existing relationship with the United States even if Great Britain joins the Continent, then WEU's future offers no bright hopes. But in view of the present debate over the existing relationships in NATO, the chances of this solution being acceptable seem poor. Also, another possibility should be mentioned. Should Europe decide to proceed with genuine political integration in the near future, the utility of WEU would rapidly diminish. However, in view of the resiliency of national sovereignty above in the major European states today, the prospect of political integration in the near future is remote.

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WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION--ITS CONTRIBUTIONS AND ITS FUTURE IN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION

by

ROYSTON C. HUGHES

Submitted to the
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AN ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this research was to examine and analyze the experiences and contributions of the Western European Union in the light of the organization's purposes and objectives and in view of the attempts toward European integration, in order to provide a basis on which to justify a positive view concerning WEU's future role in Western Europe. The basic data gathering method used in conducting this study was a chronological review of documents and minutes of the WEU Assembly, published in the Proceedings of the Assembly. This primary source material was supplemented by numerous books and articles concerning political, economic, and military activity in Western Europe. The basic conclusion arrived at because of this research is that in view of the contempory political problems and prospects in the Atlantic Alliance and in Western Europe, the Western European Union is destined to play a very significant role in the future.